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2ABSTRACT
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States witnessed
an unprecedented level of citizen involvement in neighborhood
politics. This new citizen activism,which reached into many poor
and blue collar communities untouched by the activism of the 1960s,
was manifested in two primary movements; community organizing and
community economic development.
Though community organizing and community economic development
often serve the same constituencies, the activities, philosophies,
and organizational structures of the two activities are often quite
different. Yet for a variety of reasons including the need to meet
the economic needs of members, and the need to sustain active
participation, most community organizing projects turn to some
type of community controlled economic development activities during
their active life.
The combination of community organizing and community economic
development creates several natural tensions which, at times, have
made the two activities incompatible. Community organizing calls for
short-term, predictable activities which often involve direct
confrontations with political and business officials. Community
economic development requires patience, dependence upon the
tine-tables of other actors, and a willingness to compromise and
reach consensus rather than confrontation. Yet, the need for
community organizations to sustain themselves over time has led
them to undertake economic development activities while maintaining
an organizing strategy. This effort -has required creative organization
and has not always been succesful.
This thesis will address the tensions that arise when community
organizers attempt to undertake economic development activities
without giving up their organizing activities. The thesis is divided
into three major sections. The first section examines the history of
community housing development, community economic development, and
community organizing. Rather than provide complete histories, these
chapters explore the tensions that have existed between organizing
and development over the past two decades in order to offer some
lessons for current practice. The second section consists of three
case studies of community organizations that have undertaken
development while maintaining their organizing work. The final
section includes a summary of the major tensions between organizing
and development and a series of suggestions to community organizations
seeking to undertake economic development activities.
Thesis supervisor: Langley Keyes
INSTITUTIONALIZING ADVOCACY: CITIZEN ACTION AND COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
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6Each decade leaves its popular legacy in the minds of our
academics and citizens; the thirties were the turbulent years, the
fifties spawned the silent generation and the sixties saw the youth
rebellion and urban uprisings. History and sociology, as they are
popularly conceived, have a tendency to ignore undercurrents and
contradictions in favor of neat categories of analysis which project an
unchanging future propelled by the trends of the moment. In 1958,
Daniel Bell declared the "end of ideology" and for him the future
was to be free of the youthful radicalism of the past. Less than a
year later, the first stirrings of the civil rights movement began
which were to become a nationwide explosion of social protest.
The 1970s were also a contradictory decade. Characterized by
record low voter turnouts and youth inaction which plumetted from the
vortex of the late 1960s, the 1970s have been called another silent
decade, and by some a welcome respite from the preceding decade. Like
all decades, the 1970s had a lesser known side, which is only now
being recognized as more than a mere smattering of unnrelated events.
If the 1970s was a time of quiesence on the campuses and in the
ghettos, it was also a time of unprecedented citizen involvement in
nearly every extra-electoral aspect of political and economic power.
It was a time when power politics entered many of the blue collar
neighborhoods which were often by-passed by the anti-war and youth
movements of the 1960s. This popular activity, which the Christian
Science Monitor called a groundswell movement of citizens calling for
7a return of political and economic power to the local level" left its
mark on the 1980s in ;the form of hundreds of rural and urban citizens'
organizations, numerous experiments in economic alternatives, and
a plethora of locally based, grassroots institutions.I
Two of the most substantial expressions of the growth of community
activism described above are the community organizing movement and
the community economic development movement. Each of these movements
has a wide range of organizational expressions and often competing
philosophies.
The community organizing movement described in this study is
distinct from what is commonly called community organizing in the
field of social work. Its roots are in the work of the late Saul
Alinsky, a former professor of social work who organized neighborhood
based organizations to empower disenfranchized citizens from the late
1940s until the early 1970s. The basic components of community
organizing are building indigenous neighborhood leadership for
independent local organizations, organizing around issues which have
an immediate bearing upon the social and economic like of a community,
and confronting the existing power structure with direct action to
gain political and economic power for poor and working people.
Building upon this model, the "citizen action" movement of the 1970s
added the consumerism of Ralph Nader's organizations and a more
anti-corporate ideology and now dominate the community organizing
movement.
The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw an unprecendented
increase in the number of experiments in cooperative consumer ventures,
8community sponsored housing projects, and community controlled
businesses. The sum of these activities, which might be called the
community economic development movement, has its primary organizational
manifestation in Community Development Corporations(CDCs). Though
community economic development is a somewhat amorphous term, and
CDCs are as viried as community organizing projects, there is some
consistency in the movement among the type of projects, the methods of
development, and the level of community involvement that organizations
encourage. According to the Center for Community Economic Development,
a research and resource center,
... community economic development is the creation or strengthening
of economic organizations(or more technically economic institutions)
that are controlled or owned by the residents of the area in
which they are located or in which they will exert primary
influence. The institutions that are owned or controlled can include
such forms as business firms, industrial development parks, housing
and CDCs themselves as the most broadly generalized guiding
institutions. They might also include organizations that upgrade
the human and social environment in such a way as to increase the
economic value and energy of the community. 2
To the extent that a clear deliniation can be made between community
organizing and community economic development, it is that the former
concentrates on gaining political power for citizens through which they
might gain economic power while the latter seeks economic power for
citizens on the local level and pays far less attention to political
power. However, it is inaccurate to clearly seperate community
organizing and community economic development in any historical or
analytical sense. Though both movements developed parallel to each
other, they both seek to gain power for community residents, who, in
many fundamental ways lack political or economic control in their
communities,so, community organizations and CDCs often reach the same
9constituencies. Both community organizations and CDCs often are
staffed by individuals with a broadly left ideology and both tend to
attract and develop leaders who might be called popularly radical.
Perhaps even more importantly, community organizations and CDCs
sometimes directly overlap either through spin off organizations
or a variety of work from a single neighborhood organization.
However, there are some very clear and distinct differences
in philosophy, organizational syle, and the ultimate goals of
community organizers and community economic developers. These
differences are to a large extent the reflection of two different
activities. Community organizing is confrontational and has little
use for existing institutions such as banks and private developers or
even for establishing long term programs. Community economic developers,
on the other hand must work with established institutions and focus almost
exclusively on programs and products rather than political mobilization.
Yet, for a variety of reasons which will be explored in this study,
neighborhood activists have tried numerous times to combine
community organizing and community economic development and overcome
the tensions which exist when carrying out the two activities
together. This study is concerned with the reasons why neighborhood
activists try to combine development and organizing and how they have
tried to ease the tensions between the activities; sometimes
succesfully and sometimes not so succesfully.
This study is divided into three major sections followed by
three case studies and a conclusion which identifies the tensions
between organizing and development and offers some lessons and
10
suggestions drawn from the data. Each section analyzes an important
theme concerning the combination of development and organizing, using
both historical and case information. The case studies are provided
to illustrate the themes explored in the first four chapters and
draw out the central tensions between development and organizing.
The conclusion and suggestions draw both from the historical information
and the case studies and provide some practical advice for community
organizations seeking to undertake development activities.
The first section of the study offers a history of the community
economic development movement and explores the theme, "product vs.
participation". This section is divided into two chapters. The first
explores the community housing movement and the second explores the
genesis of CDCs. This section is divided because the lessons learned
from housing development and the CDC movment are different enough to
warrant seperate analyses.
The second section is a brief analysis of community based service
delivery, which while part of the community economic development
movement, contains its own analytical theme. That theme is actual
service delivery vs. the delivery process as political empowerment.
The third section is a short history of the contemporary community
organizing movement and the difficulties it faces when attempting to
combine organizing and development. The theme of this section is
"political mobilization vs. institutionalization".
None of the chapters in this study are intended to be complete
histories of the movements they describe. Rather, they attempt
to explore the tensions between development and organizing,using
11
history and case materials to illuminate certain contradictions and
explore possible solutions.
12
Notes: Introduction
1Harry Boyte, The Backyard Revolution(Philadelphia, Temple
University Press, 1980), p. 3 .
2Rita Mae Kelly, Community Participation in Directing Economic
Development(Cambridge, Center for Community Economic Development, 1976),
p.8.
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Chapter 1: COMMUNITY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
Though community economic development has taken on a broad
definition, covering job creation, venture capital investments,
housing development, and sometimes even service delivery, this multi-
faceted approach is a relatively recent state of affairs. In its earlier
days, community economic development referred primarily to the
creation or support of employment generating business ventures.
Community based housing development, on the other hand, has a history
distinct from the CDC sponsored economic development movement, having
its roots in local housing organizations and Housing Development
Corporations(HDCs). While there is no longer a major distinction
between community housing development and community economic development,
for the purposes of this study, community housing development and
community economic development are examined seperately because they
have different histories and raise different questions about the
feasibility of combining organizing and development.
Throughout its history, the community housing development
movement has had to grapple with the conflict between product and
participation. As a community based effort, distinct from traditional
private development strategies, the participation or control by
community residents is central to the community housing development
process. However, as shall be demonstrated, the issue of community
control has never been clearly resolved, either by community activists
or policy makers. The melding of community participation with the
technical and complicated production of housing creates certain
tensions. The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of those
14
tensions by examining the history of the community housing development
movment.
Unfortunately, it is often the practice of political observors
to describe the history of organizations and social policy through
the lens of administrative bureacracies. Hence, one might understand
that the community housing development movment began with the Office
of Economic Opportunity's(OED) Housing Development Corporations in
1967, or Model Cities grants in 1965, while in fact, OED's programs
responded to a growing number of locally sponsored housing development
organizations which began in the early 1960s.1
The community housing development movement had its heyday between
the years 1959 and 1974. Nonprofit housing organizations, not
always known as Housing Development Corporations, were born in
1959 in response to the Section 202 elderly housing program sponsored
by the Eisenhower administration. Responding to the pressing need
for elderly and low income housing, churches, labor unions,
minority organizations, and local governments utilized federal grants
and technical assistance and created a plethora of locally based
housing development organizations throughout the 1960s and into the
1970s. 2
During the 1960s, a series of federal housing programs provided
the economic catalyst for community sponsors of housing development.
In 1961, the Section 221(d)(3) program bolstered the nonprofit housing
sponsors with market interest rate and below market interest rate
programs. In 1966, the Section 221(h) program helped nonprofit
community sponsors create homeownerhip programs and in 1968, the Section
236 program provided futher assistance for community nonprofits to
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sponsor elderly housing.3
In the early 1960s, many "one shot" and "repeater" nonprofits
took advantage of the federal housing programs to provide housing
for their constituents on a one-time basis.4 However, it wasn't until
1966, under the rubric of Urban America's Nonprofit Housing Center
that the concept of a more permanent and comprehensive Housing Development
Corporation came to fruition. Unlike the "one shot" private nonprofit
sponsors, HDCs grew from an effort, either private or public to
institutionalize the technical and financial resources necessary to
develop nonprofit housing with long-term community support and
participation. According to the Nonprofit Housing Center, HDCs were
to organize revolving loan funds, provide technical services in
development and management, and educate and involve community
residents in the use of federal housing programs.5
In 1966, the decision by the Office of Economic Opportunity(OEO)
to enter the nonprofit community housing development field aided the
HDCs immensely. Until 1966, OEO was occupied largely by the Community
Action Program which proposed to empower poor people through
Community Action Agencies(CAA). A few individuals within OEO believed
that assistance to HDCs would both further the goals of community
control of HDCs and provide technical assistance and seed funds for
housing development in areas neglected by for-ppofit developers. Thus,
OEO, which could not provide brick and mortar support, was able to
assist the growing community housing development movement.6
The St. Louis Bicentennial Civic Improvement Corporation (BCIC) is
a good example of a grass roots housing organization of the early
1960s which attracted OEO's support. BCIC began in 1963 when a
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Black family about to be evicted from the infamous Pruitt-Igoe public
housing development approached a neighborhood priest about help in
finding a house. An informal housing search and rehabilitation program
began which by 1964 became BCIC when it was clear that a systematic
effort to acquire and rehabilitate properties was in demand. Until
1967, BCIC acquired houses one at a time for about $1,500, and
rehabiliated them for between $6,500 and $7,000. All of the projects
were financed by a local savings and loan association which with a
locally raised downpayment pool allowed for 100% financing at
approximately 6% over 15 years. Using this process, over 60 homes were
tutrned over to new owners. In 1966, a local Congresswoman helped
BCIC by modeling what became FHA Section 221(h), which made below
market interest rate mortgages available to community housing
organizations for rehabilitation. In 1967, after Michael Mazer, the
deputy director of housing for OEO and others took an interest in the
project, BCIC recieved a $101,830 demonstration grant for staff
expenses from CEO and thus became an official Housing Development
Corporation.7
From the start, OEO was conflicted over the goals and purpose
of its support for community housing development. Paralleling its
its internal conflict concerning the CAAs as organizing institutions
or service providers, HDCs were described in very different ways within
OEO. As OEO understood the HDC it was to provide a variety of housing
services and be governed by a board elected from an open membership
in the community. Relations between an OEO sponsored HDC and local
CAAs were to be collaborative and complementary. According to OEO,
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The primary aim of the Community Action Program in housing is
the same as that of Community Action in other areas. It seeks
to organize and mobilize people and resources to create new
programs that are responsive to poor people's problems and to
shift the focus of ongoing programs so that they too are more
responsive to poor people. 8
Thbse at OEO who spearheaded the effort to support housing development
believed that housing development itself was a tool for organizing
low income people, not just a tool for providing shelter.
Housing programs'can also help the process of community development.
Anyone who has tried to develop comprehensive programs for poor
people's problems and to get them to participate in such programs
knows how difficult it can be. People are suspicious or
apathetic, hostile or tired, partly because they don't see what's
in it for them. With a well understood and deeply felt problem
like housing, a problem that's always there, motivating poor
people to participate in a community development program is less
difficult. 9
However, in the very same document that expressed OEO's desire to
use housing development as a tool to "organize and mobilize" poor
people, the agency wrote that the "...principle purpose (of OEO
sponsored housing programs) is to develop administrative and technical
capability to take better advantage for poor people of existing
programs in housing". 10(emphasis added) Thus OEO's policy makers
expressed a central contradiction which was to haunt community based
housing developers for years to come. Was housing development a tool
to motivate and assist community mobilization or was it a better way to
provide shelter for poor people?
Not long after OEO began supporting the work of the HDCs, the
Model Cities program began to encourage its participating cities to
support or sponsor HDCs. Often overlapping and even competing with
the efforts of OEO, the Model Cities program to assist HDCs never
blossomed as planned. By 1970, only 22 of 85 planned HDCs in the 147
18
participating cities were operating. 11 Conflicts over the role of
nonprofit housing and the importance of community participation in
or control of housing development remained with the Model Cities
program until its death in 1972.12
The link between the HDCs and the organizations which were later
to become the community development corporations(CDCs) was quite
close. In 1967, on the initiative of Robert Kennedy, the Bedford
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation was founded in Brooklyn, New
York to rebuild the local economy through a unique community based
development corporation. While the Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration
Corporation was not primarily housing focused, the housing development
initiated by the organization was justified primarily on the grounds
that such development could create jobs for minority residents.1 3
Thus the link between the housing movement and the CDC movment which
got its start; through OEO in 1967 was the concept that housing was a
means to generate jobs in poor communities.
In the late 1960s, the community housing development movement
grew rapidly in response to the exegencies of "urban renewal"
programs sponsored by the Johnson and Nixon administrations and local
governments. In Boston, for example, organizations like the Lower
Roxbury Community Corporation(LRCC), Inquilinos Boricuas en Accion(IBA)
and the Tenants Development Council(TDC) were established in response
to specific threats to low income housing generated by the taking of
14
land parcels by the Boston Redevelopment Authority and private developers.
Unlike the HDCs sponsored by OEO, organizations like LRCC, IBA,
and TDC grew out of specific community organizing efforts rather than
19
a policy oriented comprehensive program to solve housing problems.
As such, the contradictions between organizing and housing development
were exacerbated. In the early community based housing organizations
and HDCs, community participation was viewed as part of a new approach
to housing development, but not the central focus. Creating housing
generally took priority over mobilizing residents. In organizations like
IBA, housing development was the culmination of organizing efforts.
Thus the community housing developers had to grapple with the problem
of maintaining community activism and control while producing major
housing developments. Many community organizers and community housing
developers parted ways over the problem of maintaining community
involvement during and after the development process. Community
housing developers argued that the confrontational needs of organizing
were an encumbrance during the development process and the organizers
argued that the development process stymied organizing efforts.
In the early 1970s, the HDCs had a sufficient track record to
allow for a careful analysis of their effectiveness and success.
Proponents of community housing development argued that the approach
offered advocacy of consumer interests, a vehicle for community
participation, the mobilization of resources, local identity and muscle,
and the sponsorship of experimental and 6ften neglected housing
programs. Its opponents in government and the private sector argued that
the approach was inefficient, lacked any permanence,required substantial
technical assistance and seed money, and allowed often naive community
members to dominate the development process.15
From the community housing developers' view, the contradictions
between housing development as a political tool and the need to-
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negotiate through a complex technical process remained an issue
throughout the history of the HDCs and other community housing develop-
ment organizations. Some community housing developers stressed the
value of organizing political action with development.
Citizen experience with housing development ties the project to
local political action. In the suburban situation, the
participation of political leaders is important and this is as
a rule only possible where a proposed housing development is
percieved as a community effort. A central city housing organization
can identify with its surrounding neighborhood and achieve
significant political strength. There are a number of development
groups in Boston that are percieved by city hall as representing
the collective interests of the neighborhood...This perception
can be immensely useful to housing development. 16
Other community housing developers warned against the assumption
that citizen involvement was the essence of nonprofit housing.
While maintaining the belief that such involvement was central to
community housing development, some veterans of the community housing
development movement stressed highly skilled, and highly paid
assistance for HDCs in order to "translate community interests into
bricks, mortar, and management".17
Two of the strongest supporters of community housing development,
James Morey and Mel Epstein stressed the economic power and independence
residents could hope to gain from community housing. In addition to
encouraging widespread community participation in the development
process, community housing development was said to increase personal
incomes and savings through equity appreciation, improve the physical
structures in neighborhoods, increase the tax base, strengthen local
businesses and increase local employment opportunities; and help
upgrade basic community services. Central to the comprehensive
benefits offered by community housing development was the concept of
21
the "local multiplier" and the notion of "seed capital". Housing
development, it was alleged, had a multiplier effect on local economies
by boosting family incomes and in turn increasing local expenditures.
In addition to the low rent or equity contributions to income, local
employment opportunities were said to be created through housing
construction.
Using the tools of housing syndication and tax shelters, community
housing developers believed that income generated from housing
development, could, if controlled by the community be used as seed
capital for other economic development projects such as service
delivery or business venture development. In fact, this is precisely
what the more successful housing organizations like IBA were able
to do.
Those community developers who believed in HDCs as a tool to
gain economic power for communities had little to say about political
power in the way that organizers understood it. In some cases,
proponents of community housing development stressed community partici-
pation, in other cases they warned of its sometimes detrimental
effect upon project feasibility.19
While some organizers criticized the community developers, others
argued that development was their logical next step. One organizer
for the South End Tenants Council, an organizing group argued,
Perhaps if Mindick(a landlord) had lived up to his agreement and
maybe if Larner had not lost two buildings to us, we might
never come to the realization that to really have an impact on
the housing situation we had to start acquiring houses... This
seemed the only feasible solution to the slumlord problem;
otherwise we'd be arguing and striking forever and still not get 20
the slumlords to bring their housing up to existing code standards.
Among the strongest critics of the community housing developers
22
was Urban Planning Aid, a Boston based advocacy planning organization.
In 1973, UPA offered a strong reply both to community organizers and
developers. Their criticisms touched on both the political and
economic arguments for community housing development. In their
critique, UPA describes the genesis of an organizing project into
a development organization and the gradual deterioration of their
organizing efforts. Their story bears repeating.2 1
In Boston's South End in 1968, tenants living in deteriorated
buildings organized themselves into the South End Tenants Council
(SETC) primarily to force two slum landlords, Joseph Mindick and
Saul Larner to correct code violations in their buildings. Following
a series of demonstrations, and court oredered negotiations, SETC
extracted an agreement from Mindick for the code corrections.
Targetting Larner, the smaller landlord, SETC utilized a rent strike
and ultimately forced him out of the South End and purchased two of
his foreclosed buildings with a loan from the Black United Front.
After renaging on his agreement, the SETC targetted Mindick in
a series of demonstrations and rent strikes. During that time, six
of Mindick's buildings were put under SETC management by court order.
In April, 1969, after a three month rent strike, Mindick was forced
to sell 34 of his buildings to thec Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA) which then contracted with SETC's newly formed South End
Tenants Management Corporation to manage the buildings. In July,
1969, a third organization, the Tenants Development Corporation(TDC)
was formed to rehabilitate 100 additional units which the BRA was
forced to help them buy and finance.
SETM fell apart in 1970, largely because of pressure by tenants
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who would not or could not pay and the BRA which demanded their
rent and then cancelled SETM's management contract. TDC went on
to carry out a number of rehabilitation projects. SETC on the other
hand, the original organizing group,remained active organizing
squatters' campaigns and tenants unions. However, over time, as
the tenants living in TDC and SETM buildings faced problems with living
conditions and rents, SETC found themselves putting more of their time
into performing social service functions than organizing tenants who
still needed better housing. The UPA analysis argued that housing
conditions in the South End remained poor and displacement was still
a serious problem, but what once was a powerful organizing force no
longer existed. To UPA, the servicing of housing drained energy from
confrontational poltics and failed to solve the major problems of the
community.
UPA and other critics of community housing development with
"organizing" perspectives. stressed several key problems in combining
development and organizing. Critics argued that.community housing
development requires tremendous technical expertise to carry a
project through to completion. Development, they argued, requires
architects, financial planners, lawyers, accountants, and bankers.
Rarely do such people live in working class or poor communities so
that such professionals generally must be brought in from the outside
at a relatively high cost. Such requirements create a number of
practical problems. First, many housing professionals do not
understand the culture of their clients and vice-versa, which can
lead to distrust and suspicion, regardless of the intentions
of the parties involved. Secondly, it is often difficult for a
24
community to maintain control over their technicians, particularly
when both organizing and development is on the agenda.
A second problem for community housing development is timing.
Participation and organizing may requre quick "hits" and predictable
timetables. Often, development is slow, unpredictable and offers
numberous unexpected pitfalls. For example, a community group must
gain site control of a property, find subsidies, locate financing,
secure a contractor and monitor the work. The key, if organizing and
development are to be combined is to identify those points where
participation is appropriate and use them carefully to maintain
interest in addition to maintaining open communication with community
residents.
Finally, the question of tenure becomes critical for community
organizations that are concerned with maximizing participation or
mobilization. Becoming a landlord or owner, as UPA noted, is
particularly problematic for community organizations, for it brings
with it the problems of maintenance and rent collection in difficult
housing markets. Even when management goes smoothly, as it often
does, a landlord-tenant conciousness may develop which entirely
changes the relationship of the community organization to the community.
Urban Planning Aid leveled a strong attack on the economic
advantages of community housing development as well as the problems of
participation. Their claim was that community housing was often of
poor quality because of cost cutting, often had high rents relative
to prevailing area rents, and often had a lack of amenities due to
constricted budgets. To be fair, much of the nonprofit housing
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constructed in the 1960s and 1970s did not have these problems.
However, today, financing costs and a lack of subsidies make these
problems more extreme.
Other criticisms of community housing development are that actual
returns for community investment are small, with the lion's share
going to outside investors. Critics also question the multiplier
concept, alleging that the structure of the internal economies require
the export of local capital, regardless of housing tenure. Finally,
critics charge that the overall effect of community housing development,
in terms of units produced, spin-off jobs created, and skills left in
the community is small.
UPA concluded that organizing and housing development were at
best incompatible and at worst destructive for organizing efforts.
This leads us to the conclusion that it is not possible to do
housing development and organizing at the same time. In fact we
don't know any place where they have gone on side by side.
Further, dropping the community organizing aspect of the work is
not a conscious decision of the group involved.. .However it is
one of the consequences of attempting community housing development
with the currently available means. 22
As an alternative to development, UPA proposed such activities as
rent control campaigns, controlling outside developers, collective
bargaining for rehabilitation and maintenance, and defaulting on
subsidized mortgages when necessary.
Massachusetts state representative, Mel King offers an analysis
of the community housing development movement of the 1960s and early
1970s which is quite distinct from the Morey and Epstein and UPA
analyses. King views the community housing development movement as
part of a long and natural evolution of the minority and poor communities
26
from a "dependent service stage" to a "confrontational organizing
stage" to an "institution building stage" which includes Housing
Development Corporations and CDCs. This evolution, he argues, is by no
means over, but a much more sophisticated type of neighborhood
organizing, utilizing electoral strategies, direct action and
community development must solidify the victories of the past twenty
years.
In the area of housing, we moved from the era of sinply trying
to obtain more assistance for Black families being moved out
of desireable downtown neighborhoods to organizing our communities
...we have learned to design, package, and finance our own
development process based on human need and a concept of community
missing from strictly commercial development. 23
In the mid 1970s, the heyday of the Housing Development Corporations
came to a close. In 1974, with Nixon's dissolution of the 106(A)
and 106(B) programs which supported the HDCs, federal support all but
disappeared. In that same year, the National Center for Nonprofit
Housing closed its doors for lack of sufficient support. However,
while Housing Development Corporations died out, the community housing
development movement did not. Many of the early community housing
development organizations like IBA took on the title of Community
Development Corporations and expanded their operations to include job
creation, and service delivery. In many communities throughout the
country, CDCs which had previously concentrated on business development
and job creation initiated housing projects while many of the newer
CDCs carried out both housing and business development. In the mid
1970s, the division between community housing development and community
economic development became increasingly blurred.
Community housing development was also expanded in the 1970s by
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numerous private nonprofit organizations like Urban Edge in Boston,
Inner City Rehabilition in Springfield, Massachusetts, and SWAP in
Providence, Rhode Island which specialize in taking abandoned properties,
rehabilitating them(often with sweat equity) and selling them to new
owners at low prices. In several cases these efforts have direct
links to organizing projects(see SWAP case). Though Housing Development
Corporations no longer exist in any official sense, community housing
development expanded, diversified, and built significant numbers of
housing units throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The debate over whether community housing development is a good
way to mobilize a community, a better way of producing housing, or
both remained with the community housing development movement from
the earliest HDCs to the new CDCs. For some community housing
developers, there isn't any debate at all since their primary concern
is moving from political action to housing development as an end in
itself. Others find community housing development to be an "empty
promise" or a trap for organizers whose ultimate goal is political
change. Still others like Mel King find merit in housing development
and organizing and seek to combine them whenever possible. As the
following chapters and the case studies illustrate, organizing and
development have been combined often; sometimes successfully, sometimes
unsuccesfully; but, never without confronting many natural tensions.
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Chapter 2: COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Community economic development has a rich political history which
sheds much light on the perpetual tension between the politics of
empowerment or participation and a focus on building alternative
economic institutions and providing direct economic benefits. As in
community housing development, the political actors and coalitions which
composed the field of community economic development in the late 1960s
maintained very disparate views about community mobilization, the
role of private enterprise in development, and the appropriate level
of politicization for community economic development organizations.
This chapter is primarily a political histroy of the community economic
development movement with a focus on the tension between the production
of economic benefits and the poltical mobilization of community
residents. The first section traces the evolution of CDCs from their
birth in 1967 to the Nixon years in the early 1970s. This history
is followed by an analysis of the success of the CDCs, both from a
political and economic perspective. The third section of the chapter
reviews the recent history of CDCs and focuses on activities at the
state level. Like the first section, this history is followed by
an analysis of the success of CDCs in the past several years. In each
of the four sections, the historical experiences of CDCs is used to
analyze the tension between political organizing and economic development.
For clarity it is worth repeating the definition of community
economic development quoted in the introduction.
... community economic development is the creation or strengthening
of economic organizations that are controlled or owned by the
residents of the area in which they are located or in which they
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will exert primary influence. The institutions that are owned
or controlled locally can include such forms as business firms,
industrial development parks, housing development corporations,
banks, credit unions, cooperatives, and CDCs themselves as the
most broadly generalized guiding institutions. They might
also include organizations that upgrade the human and social
environment in such a way as to increase the economic value and
energy of the community. 1
This broad definition of community economic development is relatively
new. At its birth in the late 1960s, community economic development
referred primarily to activities which increased employment opportunities
in minority communities through the efforts of community based or
owned enterprises. Housing development was not a major focus of the
early CDCs.
In late 1965 and 1966, several Black economists and political
activists determined that the Black community had no economic or
political sovreignty and thus would never break free from its lower class
status. Some argued that political power was key to achieving Black
economic self-reliance and chose a strategy which laid the base for
succesful Mayoral elections in Cleveland, Gary, and Newark. Others
argued that there were inherent limits to the electoral strategy
and that Black communities had to begin owning and developing their
local economies. This argument led to the establishment of Operation
Breadbasket in Chicago, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Progress Enterprises in
Philadelphia, and FIGHT in Rochester, among other early experiments
in Black owned and controlled community economic enterprises.
Arguments for the self sufficient development of Black and
other minority economies were not without a theoretical basis. Roy
Innis, director of the Congress of Racial Equality and other
"cultural nationalists" argued that the Black ghetto was like a
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colonial outpost and its enonomic infrastructure and businesses needed
to be owned and controlled internally to guarantee economic progress
for Blacks. However, critics of the colonial model and the "nationalists"
argued that the AiTerican system of capitalism is an integrated whole
which has structural interdependencies between communities that further
2
the flows of surplus from both Black and White labor. This position,
espoused by some Black Marxists, held that the interconnections between
the structural elements of capitalism precluded autonomous economic
development in minority communities. Robert Allen, a Black economist
argued in 1968,
In summary, CORE and the cultural nationalists draped themselves
in the mantle of nationalism, but upon examination it is seen
that their programs weld the black community more firmly into
the structure of American corporate capitalism. 3
Innis and others like him may have been supporting economic development
in a capitalist economic context, but their concern for community control
and interest in cooperative or social forms of ownership disturbed
Black businessment, who constituted a third force in the early politics
of community economic development. To the Black business community,
represented by organizations like the National Business League, Black
ghettos required investment from the business community and increased
Black or interacial ownership of inner-city enterprises. The partner-
ship between the business and Black communities was supposed to give
Blacks enough of the benefits of the system to pull themselves up
into the affluent society. This "bootstrap" philosophy eventually
gained prominence under the Nixon administration.
Against a backdrop of theoretical debate and experimentation in
Black community economic development lay the activities of the federal
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anti-poverty programs and agencies. Until the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 which created the Office of Economic Opportunity, no local,
state, or federal agencies were designed to deal comprehensively with
the problems of the poor and minorities. OEO's creation led to the
establishment of the Community Action Program(CAP) and over 1,000
Community Action Agencies throughout the country. The CAP, a center-
piece of the "war on poverty", was created to establish institutions
and programs which provided "maximum feasible participation" in the
development of services and programs for the poor. From its
inception in 1964 until the passage of the Green amendment in 1967,
which squelched CAA's independent control, the CAP was a source of
bitter debate concerning the control of local governments over
poverty programs and the value of governemnt sponsored, community
organizing.
The CDC program at OEO was created in 1967 under Title ID of
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and was known as the Special
Impact Program. Prior to 1967, OEO sponsered single purpose services
like VISTA, Headstart, Legal Services, Job Corps, Upward Bound, and
the CAP which attempted to mobilize services for the poor under one
roof and to organize the poor to get more of the servcies they needed.
To some, OEO's Special Impact Program represented a dramatic shift in
emphasis away from the CAP model. A CDC strategy implied that poverty
was a community, rather than an individual problem and that its
cycle would not be broken with service provision alone. Secondly,
the strategy suggested that a comprehensive solution to poverty had
to include economic development such as job creation and business
assistance. 5
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As the story is told, the Special Impact Program recieved its
primary support from Robert Kennedy, who, when touring the Bedford
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn was confronted by an angryy crowd
demanding jobs and services. In response, Kennedy sent his aide,
Adam Walinsky to New York to create an economic development program
supported by both public and private funds. In fact, two programs
were established; the Restoration Corporation, governed by 26 local
leaders, and the Development and Sarvices Corporation, controlled
by 12 White men with important business and political connections.
To help finance the Bedford Stuyvesant.Program with public funds,
Kennedy and Senator Jacob Javits succeeded in passing Title ID which
gave $7 million to Bedford Stuyvesant in its first year and established
the first official CDC.6
According to the Self Determination Actc of 1968, which was an
attempt to concretize what began with the Title ID program,
The term "community development corporation" means a corporation
established by the people of an urban or rural community to expand
their economic and educational opportunities, increase their
ownership of productive capital and property, improve their living
conditions, enhance their personal dignity and independence,
expand their opportunities for meaningful decision making, and
secure the economic, social well-being and stability of their
community. 7
Like Housing Development Corporations, CDCs existed prior to
their programatic establishment by OEO and many continued carrying
out community economic development projects without OEO's assistance.
It is historically innaccurate to conclude that OEO created the CDCs.
Organizations like Progress Enterprises and FIGHT existed as CDCs
in form if not in name well before 1967. OEO's involvment brought
stability and long term funding to the CDCs it supported, but OEO
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also brought the bureacratic constraints and compromises necessitated
by federal involvement.
Passage of the Special Impact Program in 1967 had major
implications for the poverty program and the development of CDCs.
There are two very different views of the changes brought about by
the legislation and why they came about. Many of the Black nationalists
and liberals who supported early CDC legislation argued that a community
economic development strategy, unlike the CAP was a comprehensive
appproach to the problem of poverty which would give economic and
thus political power to the poor. Others argued that the establishment
of CDCs was part of the overall effort to de-politicize the "war on
poverty" and move from organizing to more controllable forms of citizen
involvment like economic development. There is much evidence to support
this analysis. 8
In the mid 1960s, many community organizers working in CAP
agencies were taking their charge seriously and organizing poor
people against local governments which threatened poor communities
with urban renewal and cuts in services. By 1967, mayors in many
cities began complaining that the CAAs were threatening the power of
city governments and should be terminated or brought under control.
Faced with unsubstantiated claims by Congressmen that CAAs in Newark
were supporting the riots of 1967 and heavy lobbying by -Chicago-
mayor Richard Daley and other mayors, Congress barely passed the Economic
Opportunity Act of December, 1967 which funded OEO and CAP. However,
key to its passage was an amendment by Representative Edith Green which
allowed local governments the option of bringing their CAP under
official control. Under the Green amendment, the federal government
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could withdraw funding from neighborhood organizations which city
9
governments found threatening.
Milton Kotler, Director of the National Association of Neighborhoods
has observed that when federal anti-poverty policy shifted in 1968
away from locally autonomous community organizing, community economic
development seemed a possible solution to the problem of funding
neighborhood political organizations. Some federal officials in OEO
preferred business enterprises to political action because it would
"move people out of the meeting hall and put them behind cash
registers". According to Kotler,
One political view(in OEO) was that there would have to be
some absorption of members of the lower class into the established
order to decrease the number of poor and to create a group from
this membership which would control those who remained. Given
this understanding it seemed most feasible to shift the funds
of the OEO programs from those who formerly organized the poor to
confront city government to those among the poor who had the
greates ambition to enter the system. 11
Though some members of OEO, particularly following the election
of Richard Nixon, believed that community economic development was an
answer to the overly politicized CAPs, others who designed the strategy
saw it as a new challenge to the existing economic structure within
poor neighborhoods. Geoffrey Faux, a left-liberal economist working
within OEO stated clearly that CDCs were to operate not for profit but
to enhance the economic power of poor communities through popular
control and/or ownership of community enterprises.12 For many
community organizers who had worked in CAP agencies and lost their
funding because they confronted local governments, the relationship
between economic power and political power was clear. Profits generated
from community based enterprises and housing projects could be used to
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support both economic and political projects.
Faced with the new economic policy of OEO, the community
organizers agreed to write grant proposals promoting entrepreneurial
development based on private enterprise or commmunity ownership.
But they also understood that tactically as much money as
possible would be applied to the poltical objective of organizing;
that is they would continue political organizing in a community
development framework. The result would be that the political
organization could continue while attentionwas being paid to
developmeng a local economy. Further, the priority of -economic
enterprise would accord with the rquirements of advancing
political organization. Housing projects and supermarkets were
high on the list... 13
In retrospect, it is not clear that many CAPs were able to make
the transition- from political organizing to community economic development
while maintaining their organizing component. Some of the reasons for
this failure lie in the nature of the development process and its
occasional incompatability with political organizing. However, even if
the development process lent itself naturally to community organizing,
the same political forces which opposed political organizing within the
CAAs also opposed it in the CDCs. In many ways, organizing in a community
economic development context was not more difficult than organizing
in a service delivery context such as the CAP. In both cases, organizers
seetking to utilize the "free space" provided by federally funded social
programs developed creative mechanisms to build organizing efforts. The
history of the CDC movement is marked by struggles of organizers and
their supporters to gain some financial support and an organizational
base from which to do their political work and opposition from
conservatives within OEO to close off those opportunities.
Efforts to institutionalize a federally funded support system
for CDCs illustrate the struggle between those who sought to use
CDCs as a basis for political power and those who sought to use them
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as a way to quell efforts at ghetto organizing through economic
opportunity. In July, 1968, an unusual coalition of conservatives,
liberals, Blacks, and Whites came together to write the Community
Selft Determination Act.14 The Act was intended to codify what had
previously been an extremely amorphous definition of community economic
development and guarantee federal support beyond the Special Impact
Program. When written, the Act had the support of 33 senators,
36 representatives(all Republicans), John McClaughy, a conservative
Nixon Republican and Gar Alperowitz, a socialist economist who did
most of the drafting. Other key supporters of the bill included the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and other Black "nationalist"
organizations. Not surprisingly, each of these parties had very different
reasons for supporting the bill and the CDC movement.
McClaughy, who represented the Nixon administration, believed the
bill offered support for small scale free market capitalism and would
gain badly needed Black support for the Republicans. Alperowitz
believed that the bill would maintain the gains of the "war on
poverty" and eventually be a tool to begin restructuring the economy.
Roy Innis, CORE's President, supported the bill as a means to achieve
seperatist economic development in Black communities. With such
disparate motivations for its support, an astute observor might have
predicted the bill's still birth. In fact, this unlikely coalition
was able to develop a sophisticated piece of legislation but the bill
was killed by an equally unlikely coalition. Labor liberals from the
AFL-CIO, who saw organized industrial labor as the road to economic
development felt threatened by the bill's emphasis on small scale
enterprises for poor communities. Their political strengteh was
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thrown behind job training programs. Joing the AFL-CIO were Black
businessment in such organizations as the National Business League,
who saw the program as an effort to muscle in on Black capitalism.
Given that many of Nixon's strongest supporters followed the position
of Black capitalism, the administration's support was never very strong
and in the end the bill was easily defeated. Thus, federal support for
the community economic development movement was restricted to the
OEO and the thirty CDCs supported by the Special Impact Program.15
By 1969, a significant number of CDCs were percieved as threats
by local businessmen and city officials who lobbied OEO administrators
and Congress to place controls on both CDC political and economic
activities. The first OEO funded CDCs quickly became victims of
both the Nixon controlled OEO bureacracy and the vague nature of the
Special Impact Program, itself the legacy of many contradictory influences.
CDC staff and leadership in these early CDCs found themselves facing
a federal bureacracy which strongly opposed mixing community organizing
and economic development as well as local officials who were not
about to repeat the CAP experience. Complaints and pressure from
Southern businessmen and politicians led both to the harrasment of
the most politicized CDCs and a shift in federal emphasis away from
community economic development to tax incentives for firms(primarily
16White owned) investing in minority ghettos.
Three highly politicized CDCs, Crawford ville Enterprises in
Georgia, the Southwest Alabama Farmers Cooperative Association, and
the Harlem Commonwealth Council all were subject to poltical
pressures, threats to their funding and long delays when funding was
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allowed. These and other CDCs faced demands by OEO that they become
self-sustaining in unreasonable amounts of time, were constantly
visited by Washington consultants with contradictory directives,
and were generally burdened by a hostile environment within OEO.17
By the end of 1969 it became clear that the Nixon administration
preferred Black capitalism to the more problematic model of
community economic development. Last minute lobbying by the CDC
community and pressure in the Democratic Congress prevented the Nixon
administration from shifting OEO's funds out of the CDC program
entirely into a new program of- tax incentives for outside investors
in Black communities. In October of 1969, the Commerce Department
established the Minority Enterprise Business Investment Company
program(MESBIC), signaling its new emphasis on Black capitalism.
Ultimately, the MESBIC program was a near total failure, as were many
of the other Black capitalism schemes.
In 1971, Donald Rumsfield, the Republican director of OEO demanded
in a report that CDCs be more closely controlled from Washinton.
In that report he wrote, "What happens if ten years from now Black
Panthers are chosen by stockholdess to run one of these CDCs? How
are you going to prevent that?"18 While many of the more well established
CDCs were untouched, pressure from Washington greatly restricted the
extent to which CDCs could develop organizing strategies or even be
truly representative of the communities they served. Only the
persistence of sympathetic administrators in OEO and the support of
some members of Congress kept the CDC program alive.
In its earlier years(1967-68), OEO's emphasis was on building
the local institutional role of the CDCs. Early OEO funding of CDCs
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was influenced by a focus on community representation, strong
community leadership, board decision making, and political clout at
the local level. According to a recent study of Title VII CDCs,
The Special Impact Program(later Title VII of the Community
Services Act of 1974) underwent significant changes in the
eight years of Republican administration from 1969 through
1976. Three general developments characterized the era:,
1) periodic attempts to substantially alter, dismantle, reduce,
appropriations for, or defund altogether the anti-poverty
initiatives undertaken during the 1960s. 2) The emergence of
small business enterprise as the premier federal policy vehicle
for assisting disadvantaged groups; and 3) a rationalization of
operations and a narrowing of focus within the agency itself
that reflected the above trends. 19
Community control of CDCs in the early years
Pressures from OEO and local governments placed upon the CDCs
raised some very serious questions about their level of community
representativeness and their abil'ity to organize citizens on any level.
Some in OEO remained faithful to the notion that community economic
development was a method to further organizing at the neighborhood
level and increase the political as well as economic power of low
income and minority communities. In 1973, Stewart Perry, formerly of
OEO wrote,
Local control by residents enhances the power and the influence
of the low income community to obtain what it needs to end the
poverty area cycle. The central and immediate goal of community
economic development is to increase that power and influence by
providing economic muscle for a representative community
organization.. .A CDC will not work without community organizing,
without community support, without constant back and forth
between the poeple of the community and CDC staff, board,
employees,and the director. 20
Unfortunately, the good intentions of government officials and policy
makers do not guarantee the success of institutions like CDCs.
An assesment of CDCs must take place at two levels; political
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and economic. A poltical assesment should include questions of
representation, organizational structure, and community activism and
control over CDC activiteis. An economic assesment should include the
form and nature of economic projects and the quantity and quality of
economic output(number of jobs created, housing units build, etc.).
Though the compatibility of community organizing and development
was not addressed directly, an OEO sponsored study of Special Impact
CDCs was performed by Apt Associated in 1973 and explored economic
and organizational issues in detail. Combining measures of actual
business or housing venture success with organizational criteria such
as board composition, an additional., independent OEO study concluded
that two thirds of the Special Impact CDCs were "succesful". Excluding
organizational issues, the study found that fifty percent of the 250
CDC business ventures examined, at least broke even by their fourth
year, a success level much higher than among small businesses in
general. However, it should be noted that CDC ventures have the
advantage of federal support and access to equity that most small
businesses do not have. 21
To put some more substance behind these generalized definitions
of success, it is necessary to examine the more detailed analysis done
by the Apt study and a supplementary study performed by Rita Mae
Kelly for the Center for Community Economic Development.2 2
The organizational structure of CDCs studied by Apt and Kelly
followed no formal pattern beyond the vague concept that they were
to be community based organizations. Some CDCs had written requirements
that members must meet a certain number of times each year and that
membership was open to anyone in the CDC target area. Other CDCs
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utilized a stockholder format in which neighborhood residents bought
one share of low priced stock in the CDC if they wanted to become
members. CDC boards, which in addition to the paid staff have ultimate
control over the direction of the organization, were chosen by a variety
of methods including self-selection with closed membership, self-
selection with open membership, selection from community organizations
like churches or civic clubs, direct selection from open membership,
or a combination of the above forms. Clearly, the form of organization
had a major impact upon the representativeness of a CDC and its ability
to mobilize community members.
According to the APT study, one half of the board chairmen and
members of the Title VII CDCs were elected directly from an open
membership while the other half gained their positions through
appointment. The Kelly study found that even in those cases where
board members were elected, low levels of community participation
were common. Many of the CDCs she observed had lower voter turnouts
than the CAAs and Model Cities organizations which rarely achieved
a 5 percent voter turnout in poor neighborhoods. This observation
does not suggest that the CDCs were necessarily incompetent at generating
participation, but may also be the result of generally low participation
levels in poor neighborhoods. However, that the CDCs were unable to
better the record of the CAAs and Model Cities organizations does
not speak well of their ability to combine political mobilization and
development.
Various demographic data for Special Impact CDC board members
indicate that as is common among many community organizations, the
44
participants were not the average neighborhood residents.
Characteristics of Special Impact CDC board members(1972)
Sex: 21% of all board members were women. 4% of all board
chairs were women.
Race: 28% of all board members were white. Two thirds were non-
white. 42% of all board chairs were white.
Employment: 66% of all board members worked in business or
economic development organizations. 47% were managers
or proprietors. 15% were professionals "working with
people". 18% were in sales, clerical, skilled or semi-
skilled work. 18% were farm workers.
Salary:21% earned less than $6,000 a month. 20% earned between
$6,000 and $10,800. 17% earned between $10,800 and
$15,600, 11% earned $15,600 and up. 23
Kelly's evaluation of the Special Impact CDCs was mixed.
Observing data on board members she wrote,
CDC board members do tend to be generally representative of
their communities. In other words they are not experts on
economic development selected to set policy as experts. Rather
they are primarily active, concerned citizens who have chosen
to stay within their area and try to make it a better place.
The CDC boards contain a higher proportion of poor and less
well educated people than one would find on most city-wide
governing-boards and certainly on the boards of most
traditional business and economic institutions. 24
However, Kelly did conclude. that the CDCs had not succesfully activated
the residents of their target areas.
This study(Abt) has produced no evidence that the masses of the
citizens within the CDC's designated community areas are
actively participating in the community economic development
movement. Compared to most other economic development activities
and government assisted endeavors, however, the CDCs and the
movement giving rise to them do represent a type of grassroots
democracy. 25
In conclusion, Kelly noted that the Abt study tested and proved that
community mobilization was central to the success of the CDCs. The
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study showed that:1) the greater the participation of CDC board
membles: in board activities, the greater the success of the CDC, and
2) The greater the accountability to the target area community, the
greater the liklihood of CDC success. In this case accountability
meant reporting to and speaking for community based organizations and
individuals.
CDCs after the Nixon years
Lacking full support from the Executive or Congress, the Title
VII CDCs continued to exist through the 1970s and into the 1980s at
a low level of growth. On January 4, 1975, President Ford signed
the Community Servines Act of 1974 which insured continued federal
support for both the CAP and the CDCs(under Title VII) until June
30, 1977 when the Act came up for renewal. The bill created the
Community Services Administration to succeed OEO as an independent
agency withing the Executive, but its passage was not achieved without
a fight. Efforts to tie the CDCs to the Office of Minority Business
Enterprise, the agency of "Black capitalism" were halted by CDC
supporters in Congress and compromise was arranged which; allowed level
funding for the CDCs. In the summer of 1975, the Office of Economic
Development(within CSA) approved twelve month planning grants of
$50,000 each for eight new CDCs. This new federal support, the first
since 1971, brought the total number of Title VII CDCs to 42.26
The period 1970 to 1976 brought changes to the community economic
development movement which substantially affected the grassroots quality
of many CDCs. The period was characterized by a growing emphasis
(in OEO/CSA) on the immediate profitability of CDC ventures and business
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capacity for staff and boards. This emphasis can be contrasted to
the early years when "softer" outputs such as employment creation,
27
community leadership ddvelopment or community cohesiveness were stressed.
Four years of Democratic control from 1977 to 1980 increased
support for CSA and the CDCs. Promotion of CDCs was recomended by
the National Commission on Neighborhoods and the President's Economic
Opportunity Commission. Support for community based organizations such
as CDCs was written into reauthorization legislation for CETA and
the Community Development Block Grant program, and was strengthened
in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through
the Neighborhood Self-Help program and the establishment of the Office
of Neighborhood Development.
Additional federal support and increasing state support of CDCs
produced a spurt of growth in the community economic development
movement. During this period, Title VII support continued, but
diminished in importance as other federal agencies, state governments,
and private organizations like the Ford foundation and the Catholic
church increased their support for CDCs.
Federal support for CDCs continued until 1981 when CSA and other
federal anti-poverty agencies were partially dismantled. As of this
writing, the fate of the Title VII program is unclear, though support
of CDCs through the CDBG program and HUD has been severely cut back.
In 1976, Massachusetts began to develop a state system of
support for its CDCs which was to change the nature of the movement in
the state, both quantitatively and qualitatively as well as provide
a model for other states which would follow suit. Led by State
Representative Mel King, progressive academics and planners in the
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Boston area set out to institutionalize support for community control
of housing and business development on a state level. What began
as an effort to support community economic development in the South-
West Corridor of Boston became a series of legislative efforts to
support CDCs throughout the state.
The Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation,
a CDC development finance institution, was established in 1976 with
$10 million from the sale of state general obligation bonds after
three years of intesive campaigning by community development activists
and supportive legislators. CDFC was created to invest the state's
$10 million in various government and corporate securities to derive
its operating revenues and purchase a broad range of debt and equity
instruments from eligible CDC ventures in the state. Thus for the
first time, CDCs were to have their own source of equity capital,
which was believed to be a major barrier to their successful establishment
of job creating business ventures.28
Massachusetts CDFC both provided economic support for CDCs and
statutorily defined their structure and powers. In order to qualify
for CDFC investments, CDCs must be quasi-public, nonprofit corporations
whose membership is open to all residents of its target area, which must
be a low income, blighted neighborhood or district.
Following just a year after the establishment of CDFC, the
Massachusetts legislature funded the Community Economic Development
Assistance Corporation(CEDAC) to provide technical assistance to the
state's CDCs and in the year following funded the Community Enterprise
Economic Development Program(CEED) which provided start-up and
administrative funding for new CDCs. Since 1977, a number of states,
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including Illinois, Minnesota, and Florida have followd Massachusetts
and established support institutions for their CDCs. 29
Community control of CDCs in the recent past
The creation of a state-wide support system for CDCs in Massachusetts
had serious ramifications for the community basis of CDCs. Since the
founding of CDFC, the number of CDCs in Massachusetts has more than
tripled. In 1978, the CEED program funded only six CDCs. By 1980,
this number rose to twenty four. However, the state CDC support
system has been a mixed blessing for Massachusetts' CDCs. On the one
hand there are now over fifty CDCs in Massachusetts, carrying out some
type of community economic development in a great variety of cities and
rural areas. On the other hand, the nature of the CDC movement has
been seriously altered.
Prior to 1977, most CDCs in Massachusetts, and in other states,
emerged from political struggles over community investment issues such
as housing displacement, housing deterioration, arson, plant closings,
retail "strip" closings, or local economic crises. In the last
several years, a number of CDCs have been established in Massachusetts
primarily in response to the availability of CDFC financing and core
support.
Rather than emerging from a neighborhood crisis and grassroots.-
activism, some newer CDCs have been established exclusively to use
CDFC, CEED, and CEDAC funds. The contrast is clearest through example.
The Riverside Cambridgeport Community Corporation (RCCC) emerged from
a neighborhood struggle over MIT expansion into poor residential areas.
RCCC, which has build hundreds of units of housing, still, after ten
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years has a strongly representative Roard of neighborhood residents
and works closely with neighborhood organizing groups. In contrast,
the Franklin County CDC in Western Massachusetts, which is only
three years old, has initiated several succesful CDFC investments but
is seen by many local residents as an organization of outsiders, staffed
by professionals who have no solid basis in the community. 3 0
When asked whether CDCs have been succesful in mobilizing community
residents to participate in economic development, a CEED staffperson
responded,
There's a range of course. In some CDCs, the staff try and
convince "the community" to participate in their activities and
the "community" asks "what's in it for us". Some of the
newer CDCs were organized by a small group of poeple who are
more often than not from outside the community and have a planning
or business background. They carry out neighborhood assesments
and then try to bring in the people. In cases where the CDC
grew out of a common struggle or dramatic problem in the community,
there tends to be much more success in establishing and maintaining
a community base. 31
The recent study of Title VII CDCs done for CSA by the National
Center for Economic Alternatives also indicates that CDCs are moving
away from their activist community orientation. According to the
study, CDCs nationwide have moved away from an activist organizing
model to a focus on "efficient" business and housing development.
Several of the older Title VII grantees also started out with
activist organizing and advocacy strategies.. .In general, all
the CDCs have moved away from explicit activism over the years,
instead developing other roles.. .32
The NCEA study suggests that Title VII CDCs exhibited a wide range of
community representativeness over the past several years. While one
of the 15 CDCs they studied is organized as a coalition of community
organizations, several have self-perpetuating boards. Several of the
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Title VII CDCs have even had their representativeness challenged by
community organizations and residents.
In general, the organizations with the most visible "activist"
images have all tended to move away from those models to embrace
more conventional, economic development strategies. 33
While a number of Title VII and non-Title VII CDCs have produced
substantial level of economic output, including businesses, services, and
jobs, the available evidence suggests that CDCs do not compare favorably
with conventional economic development strategies when judged by
conventional business criteria. The NCEA study, for example, concluded
that "the use of commercial profitability as the guideline for
selection of (.CDC) development projects can lead to unacceptable
returns for public investment". Attempts to judge Massachusetts
CDFC investments by conventional business methods have produced
a "rate of return" of less than 1% on the total CDFC portfolio.
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a growing tendency to
judge CDCs by conventional business criteria such as profitabiltiy,
return on equity, and return on investment. Even the latest analysis
of Title VII CDCs produced by an unconventional economic policy
organization, NCEA, relied primarily upon purely economic returns
for their criteria and paid scant attention to politcal and social
returns.
When measured by traditional economic criteria, CDCs are not
the most succesful means of generating employment or creating
profitable businesses. Lack of capital access, disadvantages of
scale, lack of technical expertise, and varying levels of community
control are all "encumbrences" on economic development measured by
traditional business criteria. However, CDCs were never intended to
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be traditional business institutions and if they are analyzed as
such they pale in the face of standard business performance. CDCs
were originally intended to expand local community input into and
and control over economic decision making to insure that economically
disenfranchised areas and residents recieve some level of economic
benefits. Adequate measures of CDC performance and success must
therefore measure both the political and economic returns.
At times, the political and economic roles of CDCs may be
incompatable. For instance, some development projects like job
training do not lend themselves to community organizing while others
like homestaeding may fit neatly with organizing goals. It is
implortant for CDC boards to use both political and economic
criteria when carrying out project selection.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ROLES OF CDCs
Political roles
1) The ability of the CDC to mobilize residents around economic
issues to gain resources for the community.
2) The ability of the CDC to involve community residents or
their representatives in the community economic decision
making.
3) The ability of the CDC to educate community residents
about the economic decisions which'will affect them.
4) The ability of the CDC to maintain grassroots participation
in CDC activity over time.
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Economic roles
1) Creation and or support of businesses,including manufacturing,
wholesale and retail, and natural resources.
2) Physical development for businesses.
3) Kousing development.
4) Labor training.
5) Service provision(day care, health care, etc.)
It is not clear that CDCs have been succesful when judged on
purely economic terms. Data provided on Title VII CDCs and Massachusetts
(non Title VII) CDCs suggest that overall CDC economic output has
been substantial. However, it is impossible to judge the economic
success of CDCs in the abstract since their economic output must
be compared to the economic output which would have been produced
by th.e private sector without the CDCs.
In Massachusetts, the failure rate for CDC sponsored businesses
has been higher than the failure rate for conventional small
businesses and rates of return on public investment in CDC
enterprises are lower than for private investment in small businesses.
Many Massachusetts CDCs have concentrated on housing development rather
than job creation or business deYelopment and the creation of new
housing units has been substantial(see charts on following page).
When judged by political criteria, CDCs do not fare well.
Both studies of Title VII CDCs and informal surveys of Massachusetts
CDCs suggest that CDCs have at best a mixed record by political
criteria. A minority of CDCs maintain an active grassroots base,
CEED LEVERAGED EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY
FY'80-81 AND FY'81-82
(Massachusetts)
Employment
FY'80-81
Industry No.
Construction (residential) 73
Home Insulation/Retrofit 17
Machine Parts Manufacturing --
Computer 25
Waste Recycling/Disposal 63
Textile -
Food Processing 40
Food Retailing 18
Metal Fabrication 5
Professional Services 43
Finance (Revolving Loan Funds) -
Furniture 20
Printing -
Other 12
TOTAL 320
Source: Office of Resource Development
Job Retention
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17
25
16
1,000*
40
5
10
20
12
1,182
FY'81-82 (Projected)
New Jobs Total
104 163
3 20
210 210
400 425
- 16
1,000
- 40
28 28
5
5
22
285
1,057
10
5
20
22
297
2,239
*1,000 jobs retained as a result of plant closing negotiations by Adams CDC.
U.>
These jobs are not included.
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SUMMARY OF GROSS EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR 15 TITLE VII CDCs (national)
Context
TYPES OF OUTCOMES Total Urban Rural
I. Current 3dbsa 3,743 2,357 1,386
II. Person Years of Direct Employment
overall 15 years for active and
inactive undertakings; b
Unsubsidized work in ventures
and undertakings of the grantees 12,445 5,715 6,730
Estimated construction employ. 4,500 4,305 195
CDC admin. staff 3,170 2,480 690
Subsidized employment 2,875 2,240 635
Total person years direct
employment 22,290 14,740 8,250
III. Estimated indirect employment
effects, in person years. c 9,285 6,670 2,615
IV. Total estimated person years 32,275 21,410 10,865
employment, direct and
indirect.
a Includes a count of employees in business, physical, and subsidized
and nonsubsidized community development projects of CDCs, plus CDC
employees.
b Includes all past employment in active and inactive undertakings.
c Includes employment reported by CDCs that is created or sustained by
loan guarantees or other forms of technical assistance, jobs in
in the SIA created through construction of such projects as industrial
parks etc.
* Source: National Center for Economic Alternatives
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carry out extensive community education, and actively organize
citizens around the economic issues which affect them. Most
CDCs have settled for boards elected in low turnout elections or
appointed by community organizations. If CDCs cannot compete with
traditional business development on its own terms, there is a
compelling argument that they should improve their political
capacity.
There are at least four justifications for the better utilization
of political organizing by CDCs.34 1) Lacking personal wealth and the
contacts generally taken for granted by businesses, residents need
an organized political and economic base to counter the economic
control imposed upon them by outside developers and businesses which
may have little concern for community needs. CDCs, not generally
percieved as part of the business community- by local political and
economic powers need a community base to pressure businesses and
capital sources to meet community needs. A good example is the use
of the Community Reinvestment Act to command neighborhood lending.
2) A CDC seeking to utilize public funds will have to compete with
other parties, including private developers and local government
agencies. Private developers and government agencies have influence
and power which most CDCs do not. CDCs often have only the political
strength of the residents they represent or organize. 3) CDCs need
a systematic method to involve residents in all phases of the
economic development process. Too often CDCs neglect this component,
choosing instead to mimic traditional development institutuions in
order to gain influence.. There are very few cases where a CDC will
be treated as an equal by the business community.
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Without active community participation, often impossible without
organizing, a CDC will lose its credibility in the community and with
it its power. 4) CDCs need to influence the attitudes of behavior
of neighborhood residents before the local economy can change.
A community development philosophy or ideology must be conveyed and
popularized which denounces disinvestment and corporate irresponsibility
and emphasizes locally controlled economic development. For example,
public housing is extremely difficult to develop without public
support or at least acceptance. Community owned businesses, often seen
as unconventional cannot survive without community support, nor
can worker owned enterprises and savings institutions. 35
In a period like the current one, when public investment is
threatened, public institutions like CDCs are even more dependent
upon local citizens' political power. In housing development, for
example, a CDC needs political clout to convince cities to offer
abatements for newly rehabilitsd abandoned housing, float mortgage
revenue bonds, or convey abandoned housing to community groups, some
of the necessary components for affodable housing in the current
period. To maintain or increase funding from local, state,or
federal sources, CDCs need a political base which can pressure or
even elect supportive legislators. In order for the community
development movement to gain the kind of support it needs, there is
no alternative to some form of political community organizing.
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Chapter 3: Service Delivery and Organizing
Community economic development is often distinguished from other
neighborhood improvement strategies such as organizing or service
delivery because it involves "hard" activities like the creation
or renewal of structures or the development of business enterprises.
Serv'j6e delivery is often thought of as direct assistance to
needy families and individuals including income maintenance,
counseling activities, and day care, among others. However, in the
real world of neighborhood activity, the lines between service
delivery and community economic development are often blurred.
Many development organizations carry out job training and placement,
day care, and weatherization programs which are often thoughtr6f
as service activities. According to the National Center for Economic
Alternatives, almost every one of the Title VII CDCs has undertaken
some form of service delivery, including job training, health services,
1day care, and weatherization. On the other hand, some service agencies,
particularly in the CAP have undertaken economic development
activities, either through CDC spinoffs or through their own
internal programs.
Community based organizations often undertake economic development
projects and service delivery without creating an artificial division.
However, the dynamics of combining organizing and service delivery
differ substantially from the dynamics of combining organizing and
community economic development. The central issue when combining
service delivery and organizing is whether and how to use the
service delivery process as a method of empowering citizens or to
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provide services to individuals in order to solve their immediate
problems.
Providing direct serviaes to community residents offers more
benefits and problems for community organizers than does community
economic development. On the one hand, unlike many community economic
development projects, service delivery is most often short term and
immediate, providing organizers with tangible benefits that can be
distributed among potential members of an organization.. On the other
hand, service delivery tends to reinforce individualism rather than
collective problems solving and requires tremendous personal attention
from organizers.
The organizational dynamics which encourage organizers to undertake
service delivery are essentially the same as those which suggest
community economic development as an organizing strategy. In the
Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson writes,
An organization that did nothing except lobby to obtain a
collective good for some large group would not have a source
of rewards or positive selection incentives it could offer
potential members. Only an organization that also sold private
or non-collective products, or provided social or recreational
benefits to individual members would have a source of these
positive inducements. 2
Individual versus collective needs is only one of several pressures
on organizers to seek benefit oriented programs. Another is the need
to provide short term as well as long term rewards. Whether an
organization is pressing for code improvements or developing housing,
it must provide some benefits until the long-run housing improvement
is gained.
While Olson is correct that collective benefits alone will not
provide a sufficient catalyst for an organization, the provision of
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individual goods or services can easily lead to the sacrifice of
collective goals. Analyzing the Mobilization for Youth program
which was a precursor of the federal Community Action Program,
Harold Weisman observed that service provision tended to lead to
individualism rather than collective social action.
Ultimately, if organizations of low income people design their
own programs, the organizations will devolve into neighborhood
social groups with a. heavy emphasis on the provision of
individual services... the provision of individual services to
members of an organization by the staff is extremely time
consuming and will not necessarily end in social action. The
only way to avoid such a service orientation is to provide
leadership training.. .and structures such as broader coalitions
of organizations to provide broad social action peograms.3
The central problem for organizers attempting to supplement their
advocacy work with. service delivery is not simply the decision to
provide a product rather than an organizing strategy, though this
is certainly one component. More important is the very act of the
service delivery itself. Whether or not the delivery of a service
is seen as an end unto itself or as an action or process which can
raise consciousness is central to the interests of the organizer.
There are three approaches to solving, the dilemma of using
service delivery as a means to empowerment. The first approach used
by organizers is to reject the direct delivery of services and take
a purely advocacy role in which the organization seeks to improve
service delivery for its constituents but does not provide services.
The second is to undertake, the direct delivery of services as a
function seperate from advocacy organizing through an affiliated
organization or spin off. The third approach is to utilize service
delivery as an organizing tool.
Conventional service provision begins with an analysis that
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places the client in a world of individuals with individual problems.
Thus service provision is viewed either as containing a solution to
an individual problem or providing clients with the necessary
resources to successfully and individually solve their own social
problems. A "radical" approach to service provisionwhich combines
organizing and service. delivery, views the problems of individuals
as ultimately rooted in the larger structure of the social order. 4
Therefore, traditional individualized service provision is not sufficient.
The job of the "'radical" service provider is both to provide an
individual service and to help the individual see his/her relatinnship
to the larger social order and thereby to seek a collective solution
through organized political pressure.
There are several general characterisitcs of "radical" service
delivery which can serve as criteria for organizers(see the WISE
case for specifics). 5
The first proposition concerns the selection of clients. A
primary function of radical service delivery is to bring clients
together in a collective learning and empowering experience. In
conventional service delivery, the criteria for selecting clients
may include the liklihood of success, opportunities for funding,
or opportunities for research. From a radical service perspective,
a primary criterion is the potential for political mobilization among
the client population. For example, servicing skid row alcoholics
might be seen as a priority for a traditional service agency. While
there is certainly a great need for assistance for this group, the
potential for transcending a narrow service delivery role among the
group is probably slight.
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A second proposition is to involve clients in the very process
of the service in which they are engaged. In many cases, traditional
services seperate the client from the service process itself, viewing
the client as an individual patient and leaving the intracacies
of the system to the staff. Alternatively, radical services can
involve clients in the servi6e process itself so that they can
understand and organize around the very system in which they must
act. Such an approach begins to break down the server/served
relationship and teaches clients the skills of serving themselves.
To the extent that clients are treated as if their problems are the
result of individual pathologies or deviance, political organizing
strategies will seem innappropriate. Though there are many cases
where clients' problems are individual, there are magiy situations in
service delivery where clients can be brought together to solve their
problems collectively with the staff serving as teachers and
facilitators.
A third proposition is that the provision of services can give
organizers a forum through which to present larger political issues
and organize the clients around those issues. To this end, the
process of delivering services might be understood as only one step
in a long process of politicization.
One organization which has attempted to combine service
delivery and organizing with remarkable success is the North Shore
Community Action Program (NSCAP), a CAA which serves six towns in the
6
North Shore outside of Boston. In 1979, NSCAP, which-has a reputation
in Massachusetts for "radicalism", was asked to administer the state's
fuel assistance program in the North Shore. Though funded largely by
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the federal government, the fuel assistance program was administered
through. the state office of communities and development and was
subject to the ultimate control of the governor. Fuel assistance is
a traditional "service delivery"program which utilizes individual means
tests, questionaires and one-on-one interviews to determine income
eligibility. Rather than accepting the status quo, NSCAP organized
group application sessions in each of the six towns they served, some
of which were very well attended.
Instead of using these meetings to merely process applications,
the NSCAP staff both administered the fuel assistance and offered
collective political education for the applicants. According to
Edite Pedrosa, a NSCAP organizer,
We began each session with a very political rap about energy,
fuel costs, and corporate control. We'd make them realize
that they were sitting in a room with a hundred other people
who all had the same problem: no one had enough money to pay the
exorbitant prices that oil companies were demanding for fuel.
Other agencies get people in the door and' out again as fast as
possible. But that process, where people have to wait in line
to fill out applications, just makes them feel isolated and
helpless. Our group sessions were designed to overcome those
feelings. 7
Combining application processing with political education had a
pay-off for NSCAP. Many of the applicant groups went directly from
these meetings to Boston protests against utility rate increases or
for more benefits from the state. On one occasion, residents of a
housing project who were refused fuel assistance from their local
housing authority were organized by NSCAP to confront state housing
officials in Boston who eventually ceded to their demands. From
these protests and the delivery of fuel assistance, hundreds of low
income families were involved in political mobilization and many
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were integrated into NSCAP's other activities. Many of the fuel
assistance applicants became active in welfare rights committees,
food co-ops organized by NSCAP, and tenant's unions.
Like their activist predecessors, NSCAP was stifled by the state
government. Demonstrations against state agencies became intolerable
after 100 demonstrators descended upon Governor King's office one
afternoon to demand further fuel assistance funding. Though no
direct public statement was ever offered by state officials, NSCAP's
fuel assistance program was suspended by the state after two years
and transferred to two more conventional CAPs in the area.
The NSCAP case provides at least one clear lesson. Service
delivery which is dependent upon government funding is more likely
to provide problems for organizers. However, there are numerous
situations(see WISE case) when creative organizing can skirt the
limitations of government programs or when service delivery can be
supported privately. Service delivery provides both valuable direct
benefits and numerous organizing opportunities despite the dangers
of funding controls, individualization, and administrative complications.
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Chapter 4; Community Organizing
Community organizing is used to describe so many types of
activities that the term has been rendered almost analytically
useless. There is an entire social work literature on community
organizing which is concerned with community based social service
delivery and has little in common with Alinsky style organizing.
Another schoo. of community organizing is associated with government
anti-poverty programs which seek to encourage community participation
in local decision making. A third type of organizing, which might be
called one-time oppositional organizing involves mobilization
against a specific incursidn into community life and rarely goes any
further to build permanent organizations.
This chapter is concerned with the school of community organizing
that has taken much of its philosophy and techniques from the work of
Saul Alinsky, a professor of social work who began organizing in
neighborhoods just prior to the Second World War. Some of the
organizations mentioned in this chapter, like Massachusetts Fair Share
cannot be called Alinsky -organizations since they added both consumerism
and anti-corporatism to Alinsky organizing in the early 1970s. However,
there are several fundamental principles which tie together all of
the organizations covered in this chapter, making an analysis of their
history and their potential for carrying out community economic
development useful.
The community organizing movment faces almost the exact
opposite problem faced by the community economic development movement;
that is how to generate economic products and encourage popular
68
participation. Building community power through direct confrontation
against the "powers that be" is central to Alinsky style organizing.1
At the same time Alinsky organizing works to institutionalize community
struggle to avoid "burning out" leaders or losing momentum after an
issue is won or lost. These two priorities-immediate direct action
and institutionalization- create a tension within community organizing.
Institution building often gives rise to problems of bureacratization
and stagnation. Simply organizing, without giveing permanence to
victories through institutions like CDCs or products like housing
developments can lead to discouragement and attrition by activists.
Some commun16y organizing projects have had much greater success
than others in institutionalizing victories by producing direct
benefits such as services, jobs, and housing. Many early Alinsky
organizations turned to community economic development while very few
of the new "citizen action" organizations have taken that route.
The reasons why some community organizations have moved to development
while others have not help explain what makes a succesful effort at
combining political organizing and economic development.
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore some of the
history of the Alinsky st y4e community organizing movement and the
tensions between mobilization and institutionalization through
economic development. The chapter is not intended to be a complete
history of the community organizing movement, but, rather, an historical
analysis of the contradictions between organizing and development.
Though Alinsky's methods unerwent many transformations during
his long career, there are at least five basic principles which can
be identified as central to his method of organizing: 1) What
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differentiates Alinsky organizing from one-time oppositional
organizing is its committment to building lasting community organizations
which become community institutions rather than just movements.
2) Alinsky sought to organize people for power over those issues which
directly affected their lives rather than for ideological reasons.
3) Alins-ky was- committed to building indigenous leadership in communities
so that organizers could essentially organize themselves out of their
jobs. 4) Alinsky organizing places a priority on winning victories
in order to give people a sense of empowerment. 5) Alinsky organizing
uses direct confrontation in order to express the power of citizens. 2
The ideology of Alinskyism is hard to identify beyond its
general committment to empowerment for those citizens lacking power.
In recent years, Alinsky's philosophy has come under some criticism
from organizers for lacking any political vision or sense of a larger,
long-term strategy.
... despite his wider concerns, his(Alinsky's) organizing method
aimed to mobilize fairly small groups. He wanted to see the
powerless achieve power, but he did not articulate a strategy
for attaining broader political goals. Over the years the narrow-
ness of focus proved a shortcoming, for it was often easiest for
one oppressed group to achieve its objective at the expense of
another. Indeed Alinsky's approach could finally fit into a
traditional interest group form of American politics, in which
different powerless groups accept the "givens" of income
distribution and corporate structure and compete for scarce but
expanding resources... 3
Many of Alinsky's critics point to his unrelenting antagonism
towards governmental bodies and his efforts to "fan the flames of
discontent" as evidence of his extreme radicalism. In actuality,
Alinsky and his followers, while espousing the achievement of
community power, followed a relatively pluralist model of politics.
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The goal of most Alinsky organizations' leaders was to make the system
4
work. for them; or include them as full participants. Holding
the belief that the American social system had flaws in terms of
access but was fundamentally a good system, the Alinsky organizations
were emminntly reform oriented. As one organizer for the Chelsea
Community Council, an Alinsky organization founded in 1950 explained,
"We thought about organizing citizens to get what they wanted if
possible through. the system. We rarely raised questions of how to
transform the whole... I think he(Alinsky) basically thought the system,
properly greased and oiled worked".
Alinsky's organizing work began in Chicago in 1939 with the
Back of the Yards Council and continued to his -death in 1972,
taking him to over 40 organizations. Many other organizations can
be considered spin-offs of his work; some of them the products of
his trainees, and others the products of those who adapted his methods
to their own needs.
For the purpose of this study, there is no need to survey each
and every organization which Alinsky began or assisted. However,
it is worthwhile to examine some of the more prominent organizatians to
give a flavor of the methods, styles, and organizational structures
involved. 6
The Woodlawn Organization(TWO)
The Woodlawn Organization began in 1960 when a group of pastors
in a largely Black neighborhood in Chicago facing expansion and
"slum clearance" by the University of Chicago approached Alinsky for
assistance. In addition to protesting this expansion and devising a
counter plan for the area, the organization campaigned against school
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segregation and the sale of poor quality merchandise in the neighborhood.
This activity culminated in 1962 when more than 1,200 people representing
ninety-seven communith groups formed a permanent Woodlawn Organization.
During the mid-1960s TWO turned its attention to the problems
of unemployment and struggles with the local anti-poverty agency. The
organization recieved several large job-training grants from the
Department of Labor between 1964 and 1969, and worked closely with
local youth gangs to provide jobs and services. In the late 1960s,
TWO spun off a number of projects including a mental health care
facility, a local security patrol, and the Woodlawn Community Development
Corporation.
FIGHT
Immediately following the 1964 riots in Rochester, New York, Saul
Alinsky was invited by Rochester's Ministers' Conference to help
organize the Black community to gain economic concessions from the
city and business community. In 1965, FIGHT(Freedom, Integration, God,
Honor Today) was formed and opposed an urban renewal project as its
first organizing drive. In 1966, after examining Kodak's minority
hiring record, FIGHT began a long struggle to gain jobs for minorities
in the city. After agreeing to train and hire 600 minorities in 1966,
Kodak changed its mind until intense pressure by FIGHT led to Kodak's
cooperation in training and hiring two years later. In 1968, with
assistance from Kodak, Xerox, and the Department of Labor, FIGHT
formed FIGHTON, a CDC which- spun off a number of Black owned and
operated husinesses. In thelate 1960s, FIGHT became a nonprofit
developer of low income housing totalling over 400 units. During the
early 1970s, FIGHT concentrated on school desegregation and organizing
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tenants unions. In the mid 1970s, the organization expanded to undertake
electoral activities and was succesful in electing a Black county
legislator and city councilman. FIGHT was a coalition of organizations
and by 1977 was no longer the sole representative of the Black
community. In the late 1970s, FIGHT began to focus more on electoral
and economic development activities and less on traditional, direct
action organizing.
BUILD
In 1965, with contributions from the United Presbyterian Church,
Alinsky organizers were invited to Buffalo, New York to build a
city-wide Black community organization. BUILD, a coalition representing
thirty seven community organizations began its efforts around education,
housing, and health care issues. In June of 1967, after Buffalo
experienced serious riots, BUILD began to organize around employment
issues. Stonewalled by the city's largest employees, the organization
initiated a selective buying campaign which shortly produced an
agreement on minority training and hiring from city businessmen.
In 1968, BUILD gained a concession from the Board of Education
to build a demonstration "ghetto academy" for ghetto youth. In the
same year the organization became a sponsor of a 400 unit low income
housing development which was part of the city's urban renewal
effort. Throughout the 1970s, BUILD procured job training funds from
the Department of Labor and tied the training programs to direct action
campaigns on local firms for affirmative action hiring. The economic
decline of the late 1970s encouraged BUILD to maintain its focus
on job training and minority hiring, while maintaining a committment
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to advocacy and direct action organizing.
Many- critics of Alinsky organizations both from within and outside
the organization believe that the provision of services and the creation
of alternative economic institutions functioned as goal displacement
and moved Alinsky organizations away from direct action organizing.
This charge islargely unfounded, particularly in regards to the early
Alinsky efforts. Protest and direct action was seen by most of the
Alinsky organizations as only one tactic in a wide array of methods
for achieving social justice. Many of the organizers believed that
different community leaders preferred different activities so that
community economic development did not have to drain resources from
organizing efforts. Organizations like TWO and FIGHT believed that
community economic development projects sustained their organizations
by providing immediate benefits in a way that direct action could not.
Many early Alinsky organizations were succesful at combining
their organizing and development stragegies. BUILD for instance
reached out to its constituency through job training programs and then
turned around and used direct action on potential employees.
FIGHT was able to use direct action to gain support for a long term
CDC project. Both these and other Alinsky organizations found that
many of their service provision programs and development institutions
served as recruitment vehicles.
In her detailed analysis of Alinsky organizations, Joan
Lancourt observed that while the causes are difficult to identify,
the three Alinsky organizations she studiedCout of twelve) which did
not develop any programmatic thrust such as community development and
relied only on protest, failed. Almost all of the organizations which
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did create economic development and service programs survived into the
late 1970s, though sometimes by sacrificing some of their organizing
activities.
In their later years, some Alinsky organizations faced problems
of continuing to combine organizing and development.. According to
Lancourt,
With the advent of the 1970s, a new strategic emphasis on campaign
and cooperative strategies became evident in all the surviving
organizations. All interviewees agreed that there was singificantly
less direct action. According to an organizational report, the
1970s would demand.a new stragety with greater emphasis on politics
and strengthening of programs rather than on mass protest. TWO
also began to eschew protest in favor of coexistence. This change
in strategy choice reflected the fact that by the 1970s the
organizations ahd achieved a recognized degree of legitimacy in
relation to many of the target systems. In FIGHT and BUILD,
interviewees commented that "A lot of things- that we had to do by
calling together the masses of people....-We can get done with
a phone call now." One organizer noted 'that "Demonstrations are
out of the question because pending deals with the Establishment
may be jeopardized if the organization takes to the streets". 8
Some critics cite the movement of Alinsky organizations away from
direct action organizing as proof of the danger of undertaking service
delivery or economic development activities. There is evidence, though
that leaders in Alinsky organizations supported economic development and
service activities as a conscious evolution from organizing. The direct
benefits of service delivery and economic development were the fruits
of many direct action struggles. It may be that in some cases, organizing
activities simply ran their course or died because they failed to
creatively expand to broader political programs which could maintain
rank-and-file activism. Organizations like FIGHT, which created spin
off development organizations, moved into electoral politics, and
maintained some direct action organizing because they expanded their
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program without sacrificing their original principles.
There are at least two reasons Alinsky organizations tended to turn
to institutionalization through service delivery or economic development.
The first is organizational and the second ideological. In nearly
every case, the Alinsky method calls for an organizational form which
relies on coalitions of pre-existing or newly established community
organizations such as churches, block clubs, and ethnic clubs.
Following this form, the service delivery or economic development
activities of the organizations like TWO or FIGHT were done through
spin-off organizations which were part of the larger coalition. For
example, the Northwest Community Organization in Chicago created the
Biderdike Housing Development Corporation as a spin-off which remained
a member of NCO. This allowed NCO the freedom to continue using direct
action organizing without jeopardizing the programs and still use the
development organizations for recruitment. This type of arrangement is
not always possible, as will become clear in the case studies, but for
many of the Alinsky organizations, it allowed them to combine mobilization
and program implementation.
The second feature of Alinsky organizations which led them naturally
to service delivery and economic development was their committment to
pluralist access to the economy rather than long-term structural economic
change. Because many of these organizations saw economic access as a
goal unto itself, organizing could be a means to an end and its program-
attic victory need not be seen as a compromise. This "non-ideological"
feature of Alinsky organizing changed in the mid-1970s and eventually
was substantially altered by the new "citizen action" organizations
like Massachusetts Fair Share.
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During the 1960s, an expanding economy,_and a substantial social
welfare system provided enough. room for Alinsky organizations to win
concessions from government and the private sector. However, the
1970s brought slower growth., local tax revolts, shrinking expenditures
for social services and increased corporate opposition to reform..
In the early part of the decade, the Alinsky strategy began to change
from developing;localized interest groups which sought a larger piece of
the pie to building broad coalitions which espoused anti-corporate
populism.10 Both in his secod book,Rules For Radicals, and his last
organizing project, the Citizens Action Program in Chicago, Alinsky
argued that organizers had to work with the "bottom 80%" which
included white working class communities as well as minorities and the
poor.
Chicago's Citizen's Action Program began in 1969 as the
Campaign Against Pollution shortly after an air inversion caused columnist
Mike Royko to write a scathing article.which instigated hundreds of
supportive letters. Alinsky, who by 1969 had decided that coalition
building in white working class communities was an important new direction
took the letters and built an organization of white collar and blue
collar workers, ecologists,and a few young radicals who had been active in
the "new left" Students for a Democratic Society(SDS).
Demanding that their corporate nemisis, Commonwealth Edison use
low sulpher fuel and reduce their rate increase, 1,000 CAP members
descended upon a stockholders meeting and eventually won both demands.
In the early 1970s, CAP campaigned for porperty tax reform, opposed an
expressway expansion, and exposed bank redlining in Chicago neighborhoods.
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By 1973, CAP had 30 active neighborhood chapters and 50 senior clubs.
According to several former CAP organizers, CAP sputtered and died in
the mid 1970s primarily because it failed to creatively expand its
program beyond very localized issues.
Alinsky organizations continued to exist throughout the 1970s,
often supported or organized by the Industrial Areas Foundation, Alinsky's
training center. Another network of community organizing groups which
took much of its strategy and tactics from the IAF is the New England
Training Center for Community Organizers(NETCCO) which is affiliated with
a national coalition of community organizations known as National
People's Action. NETCCO affiliates are primarily city-wide organizations
consisting of neighborhood block clubs, church groups, senior clubs and
others organized into city-wide coalitions. Many of the NETCCO
organizations, like the original Alinsky groups have attempted,
sometimes succesfully, to combine organizing and economic development.
Their methods will be examined more closely in two of the case studies.
Citizen Action
From 1973 to 1975 a confluence of several organizing efforts produced
a new type of community organizing known as "citizen action", which
now includes more than ten state wide organizations. Citizen action's
primary influences were the anti-corporatism of the Nader consumer
movement, the direct action community organizing and the organizational
structures of Alinskyism, and the energies and ideology of the "new
left".
Much- of the expansion of the community organizing movement in
the last ten years is directly attributable to the work of new left
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veterans. Many of the leading organizers of citizen action gained
their experience in the early organizing efforts of the Students
for a-Democratic Society, the civil rights work of the Student Non-
violent Coordinating Committee(SNCC), and the National Welfare
Rights Organization.1
In 1972 and 1973, SDS organizers in several cities moved from
university centers into working class neighborhoods to transfer the
radicalism of the student movement into grass roots politics. Michael
Ansara, one of the founders of Massachusetss Fair Share wrote in 1975,
The central question of course, is how stable mass membership
organizations can be put together.. To be sure, the answer
varies from community to community. In Dorchester, for example,
a popular left group must include~thnee elements: young people
who are energetic, who have the time to do the work, and who
respond most positively to socialist ideology; tenants, who ensure
that the interests of the poor are represented; and some substantial
percentage of blue and white-collar homeowners, who provide
stability, continuity and the political clout denied to young
people and tenants precisely because they are economically,
marginal. 12
The model Ansara projected, in many respects the alliance of
workers and students which the SDS sought in vain, was developed
using a populist, anti-corporate ideology grafted on to the direct
action, local orientation of the Alinsky model. In fact, in 1974
and 1975, some of the SDS leadership became staff people in Alinsky
organizations like CAP to learn the rudiments of new populiet
organizing. With experience, their new organizations dropped much
of the early hopes for socialist politics, but unlike the Alinsky
organizations they remained strongly anti-corporate and sometimes
vaguely anti-capitalist. According to citizen action theoriticians,
their ideology could be called "economic democracy" or "a homegrown
non-ideological American radicalism that aims to redress imbalances
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percieved in wealth and power by creating vocal low and middle income
constituencies and grass-roots leaders". 1 3
Massachusetts Fair Share is perhaps the largest and in some ways
the most successful of the citizen action organizations. With over
80,000 family members and active chapters in more than ten cities,
Fair Share has, in just seven years developed a powerful grass-roots,
anti-corporate organization. What makes Fair Share unique is five
characteristics.common among community organizing projects, but rarely
combined in one organization. Fair Share has its active base in local
neighborhood chapters and city-wide organizations and committees. In
addition,the organization has an active state-wide presence, primarily
in the arena of consumer issues like tax reform, hazardous wastes, and
utility rates. In theory and often in practice, neighborhood leaders
are trained and recruited around very local issues such as streetlights,
housing code violations, and even stray dogs; and eventually are
encouraged to participate in state-wide political issues. In addition
to its chapter membership, Fair Share also has a large at-large
membership which is recruited by paid canvassers who go to nearly
every door in the state, offering political education and raising funds,
primarily on Fair Share's reputation as a consumer protection organiz-
ation. The-funds raised door-to-door as well as those raised from
chapter activities go to support an organizing and research staff of
over sixty people who work out of central and regional offices.
In many ways, Fair Share and other citizen action organizations
have retained the basics of Alinsky organizing, but they've added a
new dimension; a broad political vision.
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Organizers are urged to create campaigns and build chapters
around winnable, nondivisive issues, to use existing social
institutions-such-as churches for support. The ideal Fair
Share issue is one that unites blue collar residents of varying
racial and ethnic backgrounds .-around a common economic problem,
perhaps a bank-s failure to invest in its own neighborhood.
Ideally, the issues will lead members to question the political
and economic structure in ways similar to those of the Fair Share
staff, although that goal is never explicity. 15
In 1979, six state-wide community organizations like Massachusetts
Fair Share came together to form Citizen Action, a national coalition
which shares resources, training, recruitment, and strategic planning.
By 1981, Citizen Action included state-wide groups from eleven states
which, though quite varient in specific structure, shared similar
goals and objectives. Citizen Action includes organizations like
the Ohio Public Interest Campaign which functions as a coalition of
labor, church and community groups, Oregon Fair Share, and the
Connecticut Citizen's Action Group which are strictly membership
based organizations. While the organization is still relatively
unstructured, Citizen Action represents one of the first efforts to
put what had been a loosely defined movement into some organizational
form.
In the past two years, Citizen Action organizations have begun
to expand their focus beyond direct action community organizing.
Altering what was once an unalterable maxim among the new leftists
in Citizen Action, several organizations are now exploring state-wide
electoral strategies.
Community economic development and service delivery is a very
recent addition to Citizen Action strategy. In the past year a few
Citizen Action affiliates have begun to explore community economic
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development strategies. The. Ohio Public Interest Campaign(OPIC), which
has been organizing against plant shutdowns, is currently
developing a worker/community buy-out program. Massachusetts Fair
Share is building a housing development program and has had extensive
experience with community weatherization programs(See case 3).
Because community economic development is such a new
undertaking for Citizen Action organizations, it is worth quoting
at length from Fair Share's rationale for a development program.
There are three reasons for expanding upon Fair Share's organiza-
tional capacity to advocate effectively and win progressive reforms
by pressuring decision-makers.
-Positive solutions: Fair Share communities can benefit from
the local organization's ability to provide positive solutions to
local problems. Pushing others to take certain actions, presently
our only modus operandi, can be supplemented by actually bringing
positive alternatives to existance.
-Broader community support: The ability to effect positive
solutions makes the organization's advocacy more effective.
Criticism on public issues can come from an organization that under-
stands the realities of actually running something rather than one
that .is seen only as an outside critic. Another benefit is the
increased loyalty that Fair Share and local community groups will
receive from playing a larger role in the economic and social lives
of its members through participation in a variety of business
and service programs.
-Self-sufficiency: In the long run, economic development
enterprises can provide Fair Share with a stable, independent base of
financial support to fund our continued citizen action organizing
efforts. Our first business venture, in energy conservation, has made
clear both the potential for net income at some point and the
difficulty of developing a venture that can throw off significant
cash in the short run.
Establishing the proper balance between advocacy and economic development
is difficult. If the proper balance is struck, however, there is
much that each. strategy can contribute to the further growth and
significance of the other. This is particularly true in a citizen
action organization once a strong membership base has been built. The
advocacy/action part of the organization can insure a truly democratic
basis for the development arm. It can also provide additional
clout in gaining poliitcal support where that is key. Most importantly,
it can keep the development arm from becoming isolated from the very
community it is supposed to represent. 16
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Examining the community organizing movement without mentioning
the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now(ACORN) would
be incomplete since ACORN is large, national, and takes a different
approach to organizing that that taken by the Alinsky groups or by
Citizen Action.
Acorn, which began in 1970, now has over 25,000 active member
families in 19 states and is expanding into almost four states a
year.17 Like other community organizations, ACORN works on local issues
and is based in neighborhoods, but has also attempted to build a
national presence on its own. ACORN's founders come out oft the
National Welfare Rights Organization rather than SDS and their
organizing strategy reflects that heritage. Claiming that Fair Shane
and other CitizeniAction organizations have steadily experience an
upward drift in the incomes of those they organize, ACORN maintains
that it is committed to an authentically low income constituency.
Like Citizen Action, ACORN has expanded its activities beyond
neighborhood level organizing. A sister organization, the United
Labor Organizations, is attempting to build a union among low wage
workers in such industries as fast foods and health care. While
ACORN has not undertaken a formal community economic development
strategy, the organization has sponsored a number of food cooperatives
for its members and is currently leading a national squatting campaign
to gain sweat equity housing for low income city residents.
Debating the move from Organizing to Development
The debate over organizing versus development has raged on for
at least ten years but has added little systematic analysis to
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solving the tensions between the two activities, However, much of
the debate alerts us to the potential problem areas and sets a
framework for melding the two activities.
The debate consists of three central arguments. The first,
expressed most recently by Mel King(see chapter 1) is that community
economic development is a natural progression or stage in the development
of community power and struggle. The second position, argued most
cogently by Stan Holt, a long-time veteran of community organizing is
that community organizing and community economic development are
incompatable.18 The third position, argued by Pablo Eisenberg of
the Centee for Community Change is that organizing and development
are, in certain circumstances, complementary activities.19
The Case Against Development
In her study of community organizations, Janice Perlman found
that in many cases there is a significant ideological difference
between the organizers of direct action groups and the directors of
20
CDCs. She observed that the direct action organizations tend to
have more radical leadership than the CDCs which while initiated by
community leaders, often attract entreprenuers and professionals.
Many organizers believe that this schism arises from the natural
"compromising" or "co-opting" characteristics of CDCs. Perlman
observed that in many cases,
... the move from protest to program often leads to new forms of
dependency and to the demise of the original participatory
structure and mass base of the organization. As the energies,
resources, and leadership skills of the organization are focused
on "hard" programs, the role of the "soft" community side tends
to diminish and may eventually whither away altogether. 21
Stan Holt cites four primary reasons why community economic
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development ultimately co-opts direct action organizing. 1)CDCs are
often brought in from outside the community and fund raising,
proposal writing, and program development which take time away
from organizing follow the needs of outside funding sources. 2)
Over tine organizers may find that development gets short term results
and they may begin believing that development can do what organizing
can't. This is a false hope. 3) Development tends to encourage a
new type of organizational leadership with more education, higher
class structure, fewer roots in the community, and less committment
to building the organization. 4) A successful CDC depends upon a
partnership with cities, private businessmen, lending institutions,
and the community. Therefore, consensus planning and cooperation are
key, making confrontations detrimental to the development process.
Eventually, this type of consensus organizing, which does not
encourage participation, may alienate the membership which will
drift away.
As an alternative to combining community economic development
and organizing, Holt proposes several options. The first is for
community organizers to directly control CDCs and use them sparingly
for the purposes of direct action organizing. A second option is
to create spin-off development organizations which function completely
independently of the organizers. A third option is for community
organizers to force city agencies and private businesses to carry out
the activities of a CDC. Unfortunately, in many cities, this is
politically and economically infeasible.
The Case for Development
Pablo Eisenberg of the Center for Community Change and others
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have responded to Holt by arguing that:
1) CDCs vary substantially from city to city and that some are the
results of indigenous struggles and maintain a committment to local
priorities and politics. 2) The art of organizing is based on
flexibility and adding development can be succesful if organizers
are creative in the application of development strategies. 3) There
are few organizations which can sustain themselves for long without
delivering services or direct economic benefits to their constituents.
4) Community economic development can provide a valuable, though
limited source of income for community organizing activities.
5) Many community economic development projects such as cooperatives,
credit unions, and worker owned businesses pose compelling alteanatives
to capitalist economies. 6) At some point, simple direct action
oppostion has inherent limitations which can only be circumscribed
by posing alternative programs and institutions.
In the past several years, the debate over combining organizing
and development has softened, though some community organizers still
maintain serious scepticism about the combination. According to the
Center for Community Change,
Enough experience has now accumulated to belie the most dire
predictions of the community organizers and activists who felt
that development would inevitably divert citizen organizations
from their main function in advocating the interests of the
neighborhood, compormising their goals and causing them to
avoid important fights. But there is also evidence to show
that moving from organizing into development is neither without
pitfalls and dangers, nor a simple process. It can require .
significant changes in organizational structure, staff composition,
decision-making processes, and the institutions and groups who
must be considered as partners. And development is inherently
a difficult process, whatever the auspices. 22
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Summing up
The four activities covered in this study have not followed
a neat linear pattern over time. Housing development did not evolve
into community economic development. Nor did community organizing
evolve into community economic development. Rather, the four
activities-community housing development, community economic development,
community service delivery, and community organizing-developed in
a parallel fashion. Community housing development continues in a
myriad of institutional forms even though Rousing Development
Corporations no longer exist. Community Development Corporations,
which began several years after the first Housing Development Corporations
were founded, continue to carry out a broad variety of economic development
projects, and CDCs exist in many communities as strongly rooted
institutions. Community service delivery continues, largely in the
Community Action Agencies. Community organizing is a growing field
and manifiests itself in a variety of organizational forms, including
Alinskyism, low income organizing, and Citizen Action.
Though the growth and maturation of these four activities-
housing development, economic development, service delivery, and
organizing- took place in a parallel fashion over the past twenty
years, there have been many overlaps and combinations of the
activities. Each activity has a life, history, and institutional
context all its own, yet each of them has borrowed from the other
activities over time. Community Development Corporations borrowed
much of the experiences, structures, and methods of the housing
development movement. Many Community Development Corporations
evolved from community organizing projects and utilized the methods
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of community organizing in their work. Likewise, many community
organizations have incorporated community economic development into
their strategy and some have even established development institutions.
While there is no chronological linear progression from one
community activity to another, history suggests that community
organizations and community organizing projects either institutionalize
their organizations through activities like community economic
development or they fade away over time. Compared to one-time
oppositional movements, community orgaizations like Alinsky groups,
ACORN, or Citizen Action have institutionalized their activities
through elaborate chapter structures, leadership training, and full-
time staff. However, in the history of the community organizing
movement we. find that several factors operate to make more complex
institutions like community development organizations necessary for
community organizing projects to survive. It should be noted that
community economic development is only one of several more complex
institutinnalizing activities undertaken by community organizations;
including electoral campaigns, service delivery, and legislative/
lobbying efforts.
One dynamic which propels community organizations into development
activities is the immediate and unmet needs of their constituents.
Particularly in minority and low income neighborhoods, there is an
acute need for physical and economic- development which private
developers simply will not undertake. If a community organization does
not undertake development in these situations, no one else will and
the community orggnization will eventually lose the allegiance and
respect of community residents. It is no coincidence that nearly every
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Alinsky organization operating in Black and Kispanic neighborhoods
eventually turned to some type of community economic development
activity.
Another dynamic which propar-ls community organizations into
development activities is the need to maintain what Mancur Olson
calls the "economy of organization". Collective benefits, no matter
how impressive and newsworthy cannot maintain an organization
over time. At some point in their organizational lives, most community
organizations f ind it necessary to provide some immediate individual
benefits to their members and other community members. The problem
is providing individual benefits while maintaining a collective
approach to collective or community problem solving.
While some community organizations never expand beyond
confrontational mobilization to institutionalization like community
economic development, there are few examples of such organizations
which have survived over a long period of time. Most community
organizations find that at some point in their evolution, the need
to solve neighborhood problems themselves and the need to provide
individual benefits compel them to undertake activities such as
community economic development. Development and organizing are
not contradictory activities; rather, their combination is a
necessity. However, combining community organizing and community
economic development creates several natural tensions. The purpose
of the following case studies is to explore those tensions in order
to begin creating adequate structures and programs to contain, if
not alleviate them.
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Case I
This case study describes Somerville United Neighborhoods and the
comnunity development corporation it created, SUN-CDC. SUN is a com-
munity organizing project, modeled closely after Alinsky organizations.
The case describes SUN and SUN-CDC and analyses the successes and fail-
ures of SUN's efforts to combine community organizing and community
economic development.
The Setting
Somerville is an old, working class city located just north of Bos-
ton and adjoining Cambridge. It was at one time a major industrial city
but has lost much of its employment base and faces major unemployment and
problems of poverty.
Somerville's population declined steadily from the 1940's until the
late 1960's when it had a temporary increase until declining again by
the 1980 census to 71,000 residents. The population is a changing one
which is becoming increasingly skewed by age. Census figures show a con-
sistent loss of middle aged residents and an increase of elderly and young
children. More importantly though is the major increase in the percentage
of young people aged 18 to 24 which reflects a growing population of stu-
dents and young professionals. This phenomenon has had a major effect
upon the availability and price of housing in the city.
Another important change in Somerville's population characteristics
has been the growth of the minority communities. Still over 90 percent
white, and largely Catholic, the city has gained sizeable Portuguese, Hai-
tian and Vietnamese immigrant communities over the past 15 years. The
influx of these new immigrants, particularly the Haitians and Vietna-
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mese in the past 5 years adds a new language and employment problem to
the city.
Somerville's median income is substantially less than the Boston
SMSA and the gap between the city and the SMSA widened between 1960 and
1980. Nearly 17 percent of the population received some form of depen-
dency grant in 1980.1
In its first two years of existence, the SUN-CDC addressed itself
almost exclusively to problems of employment and housing. They are with-
out a doubt two of the most problematic areas of life in the city.
Somerville residents work primarily in unskilled or semi-skilled marginal
occupations. Most of the population can appropriately be called blue
collar and work as clericals, service workers -and operatives. Between
1970 and 1980, Somerville lost approximately 11 percent of its population
but also lost 16 percent of its total employment. It is estimated by the
Metropolitan Area Planning Commission that Somerville exports nearly three
quarters of its work force to surrounding communities.
In the 1970's and 1980's Somerville's unemployment averaged over 1
percentage point higher than the rate of the SMSA.
2
The great majority of Somerville's residents live in wooden two and
three decker houses, which are primarily owner occupied. The housing
stock is old - 90% were built before 1939 - and much of it is in serious
need of repair. A 1979 study done by the city planning department illus-
trates that in East Somerville, a relatively poor section of the city, 74
percent of the houses are in need of repairs less than 25% of value and
7% are in need of repairs more than 25% of value. Somerville is currently
facing a severe housing crisis. The latest occupancy rates, though highly
debated indicate that the city has a rate substantially less than 5 per-
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cent. Almost all new construction has been of high rent, multi family
apartments. Recent increases in condominium conversions and upward
pressures on rents have squeezed blue collar households in favor bf the
newer and younger population. Concern over the housing crisis is growing
as evidenced by recent victories for pro-rent control Aldermen.
Somerville United Neighborhoods
Somerville United Neighborhoods began in December of 1974 when a
group of low income residents and concerned clergy decided to undertake
community organizing in the city. In 1976, with a grant from the National
Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, SUN was able to hire a staff and begin
the process of building a solid neighborhood organization.
SUN is structured along the lines of a traditional Alinsky organiza-
tion and has organizational ties to the NETCO network of community organi-
zations. Rather than having city wide membership, the organization is
essentially a coalition of small neighborhood block clubs, churches, ten-.
ant associations, senior citizen clubs, and localized issue committees.
Though many of its sixty coalition affiliates were organized directly by
SUN, some were not and retain a certain level of independence. Until
1982, delegates to SUN's annual Congress did not have to be SUN members
so than non members were encouraged to become involved in the organiza-
tion.
SUN is governed by its member organizations and individual members
at its annual Congress. Each year delegates elect officers and SUN's
board members and also vote for priority issues for the coming year.
SUN's board meets meets monthly to set policies, review the organization's
work, control the budget and work with the staff. A SUN senate consisting
of one representative from each organization represented at the Congress
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meets quarterly and oversees the Board, thus guaranteeing a relatively
denocratic organization.
In its six years of existence, SUN has worked on a broad array of
issues, reflecting the extensive number of different organizations and
interests represented in the coalition. Though the list of SUN's accom-
plishnents is long, a review of some of its victories offers a sense of
the organization. Over the first six years, SUN:
- Secured funding for a~fu.l-time after school and evening recreation
and education program for teens and adults to operate out of four
community schools.
- Organized the United Seniors to work successfully for funding for
a mini-bus progran of 6 vans to transport seniors.
- Organized the Winter Hill Neighborhood Association which has gotten
bridges repaired, gotten zoning changes to prevent high rise con-
struction, better police protection, buildings repaired.
- Organized over 20 block associations which have gotten traffic
safety signs, clean up of vacant lots, repaving of streets, traffic
islands, new street lights, etc.
- Successfully. lobbied and passed a strong condominium control ordi-
nance.
At its 1981 Congress, SUN picked as its organizational priorities the pas-
sage of rent control, the funding of youth programs, continued pressure
against condominium conversions, and tax reform. 5
SUN has operated in an adversary relationship with most members of
the city government for most of its history. Somerville is a small, poli-
tically insular city and the few "ruling circles" in the city government
opposed SUN from its inception. This conflict between entrenched powerful
families and a direct action grassroots organization was central to the
problems faced by SUN when it decided to move into community economic
development.
95
SUN's Transition to Development
To some extent, SUN's turn to community economic development was a
natural progression from organizing around housing issues. Faced with
a severe housing crisis in the city, consisting of shortages, high rents,
and deteriorating housing stock and limited by the purely oppositional
nature of organizing some SUN members believed that community economic
and housing development offered an alternative. In February of 1977, a
SUN Community Development Task Force was established to discuss establish-
ing a SUN related CDC which could focus on housing and energy issues.
These meetings produced a proposal to establish an insulation factory
which was pursued with the help of a planning grant until September 1978
when the project was abandoned because of vastly inflated costs, a lack
of equity and changed market conditions. In the fall of 1979, SUN applied
to the Massachusetts CEED program for staff support and received a grant
sufficient to hire a full time staff person.6
SUN-CDC was formally incorporated in February of 1980 with a 17 per-
son board and over 200 voting members. Most of the organization's ener-
gies were devoted to housing. The CDC acquired twelve units of housing
to rehabilitate and operate as subsidized rental housing. Working with
local banks, SUN-CDC had $600,000 in low interest mortgage money set aside
by the Mass Home Mortgage Finance Agency-for SUN-CDC referred applicants.
In 1981, the organization received a HUD "self-help" grant to purchase,
rehabilitate and sell 21 homes to low and moderate income families.
Though its first priority was housing development, SUN-CDC also was
involved in a number of business development projects. The CDC provided
technical assistance to several businesses and helped four firms approach
the Massachusetts Commuity Development Finance Corporation for assistance.
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Finally, the CDC helped establish a women's weatherization cooperative
which carried out much of the work of the state's low income weatheriza-
tion program in Somerville.
Though the SUN-CDC was successful in attracting grant monies and
initiating programs, it has had little actual success in completing pro-
jects in its two years of existence. In the Winter of 1982, the CDC
faced major financial problems as many of their grants ran out and expec-
ted funding was not forthcoming. Accused of mismanagement, the Executive
Director resigned and was replaced by an interim director who is in the
progress of negotiating some type of merger with the Somerville Corpora-
tion, an organization also active in community economic development but
not a CDC.
Lessons from Somerville: Problems and Successes
According to both staff and Board members, SUN-CDC's financial pro-
blems had little to do with the efforts to combine SUN's organizing with
economic development but rather was the result of some bad luck and poor
adminstration. However, SUN-CDC did have many difficulties combining
community economic development and organizing and a review of these pro-
blems is quite instructive. Just prior to the resignation of SUN-CDC's
Executive Director, a major debate developed on the Board of Directors
about the CDC's role, vis a vis organizing and the methods to combine
organizing and community economic development. The problems which faced
the CDC can be divided into two types: organizational and project speci-
fic. Within each of these categories there are a number of specific
issues which deserve elaboration. 8
Organizational Issues
According to a recently performed organization assessment, many of
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SUN-CDC's problems stemmed from a lack of philosophical clarity from its
earliest days.
The original vision (of the CDC) was that economic development pro-
jects could build the membership of SUN and enable an essentially
political organization to participate directly in the economic life
of the community. Thus development was seen as a vital resource for
the grass roots organization. During the past few years, this
vision has faltered to the point where each organization (SUN and
SUN-CDC) views the other as a barrier to the achievement of its
goals rather than a facilitator. In. the eyes of the development cor-
poration (staff and some board members) citizen action has impeded
its ability to form the working relationship with actors in the
development process necessary for their success. The organizers and
organizing oriented board members perceive that the development cor-
poration drifted from its original purpose9 and has generated commun-
ity resentment, rather than participation.
Though the by-laws of the CDC make it clear that the connection between
the organizing efforts of SUN and the development efforts of the CDC were
to be close, in many of its projects this simply was not the case. This
lack of philosophical clarity had primary causes; the composition of the
board of directors, the speed with which the CDC committee actually took
up development efforts, and the attitudes and philosophy of the first
director.
The original Board of Directors of the CDC was dominated by SUN mem-
bers with higher than average incomes, education and technical knowledge.
To some extent, community leaders more comfortable with development than
confrontational organizing gravitated to the CDC. Thus even though the
CDC was committed to organizing in theory, many of its board members were
committed to community economic development without coordinating it with
organizing. A second problem is that the original SUN community develop-
ment committee had very little time to explore the problems and potential
of community economic development before they incorporated and began their
first venture, According to the second CDC Director,
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SUN's Board didn't really know what Community Development was all
about. Before they could turn around there was all this grant
money floating around and all these people carrying out activities
in the name of SUN. All of this happened too fast with too little
educatiig. Maybe SUN wasn't even ready to take on a development
agenda.
In interviews, a number of CDC Board members noted that the CDC Board
had uneven levels of experience and knowledge of development and organizing.
Because there was little Board training, new members with little develop-
ment experience had trouble keeping up with CDC activities and felt that
they were not in control. Conversely, some Board members who had develop-
ment experience in their professional capacity were not trained in the
methods or philosophy of organizing.
Finally, SUN and CDC's first director had no organizing experience and
turned out to have little sensitivity to organizer's needs and idiosyncra-
sies. By the time the Executive Director resigned he clearly stated that
SUN's organizing agenda interferred with the development efforts of the
CDC.
A second organizational problem for the CDC was the structural rela-
tionship with SUN. At the time of the CDC's founding, the director of SUN
was leaving and was not replaced for some number of months, which left a
leadership gap. Rather than clearly establishing the CDC's relationship
to SUN the CDC committee took the easiest path. SUN-CDC became neither a
spin off organization nor a sub organization of SUN. It became a hybrid
which bore SUN's name but had legal organizational autonomy. This organi-
zational ambivilance led to continued confusion and debate over the exact
relationship and eventually played a major part in splitting SUN from the
CDC. According to the CDC's second Director, much of the organization's
internal difficulties could have been avoided if the CDC had been a sub
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organization of SUN which clearly had to answer to the SUN board.
According to the organizational assessment,
In the past there has been no formal and consistent communication
between the staffs, boards, and leadership of SUN and the CDC. In
fact, interaction between the two organizations creates obscles to
each other's progress instead of offering shared resources.
Another source of structural tension was the financial relationship
between SUN and the CDC. It is clear from the earliest CDC documents that
SUN believed monies raised from CDC grants and projects could be used to
supplement SUN's own budget and support its organizing activities. Par-
ticularly in its first year, the CDC relied on SUN's reputation and accom-
plishments to raise funds from outside supporters. Though the CDC did
reimburse SUN, the exact financial relationship between the two organiza-
tions was never spelled out clearly and caused a great deal of tension
between SUN and CDC leaders.
A seemingly unimportant question which became a major source of organ-
izational friction was the discrepancy between SUN organizer's salaries and
the salaries of SUN-CDC staff. This issue was complex because professional
planners who operated CDCs command much greater salaries than organizers,
but the issue was never adequately addressed.
One particular project is a good illustration of both the organiza-
tional and project specific problems face by the CDC. One of SUN-CDC's
first projects was the purchase of two six unit buildings for the purpose
of rehabilitation under the HUD Section 8 Moderate and Substantial rehabili-
tation rent subsidy program. The project, know as "Walnut Street" was
intended to be rental properties owned and managed by the CDC,
After purchasing the Walnut Street buildings with a city grant and
securing financing with the knowledge of future grants and subsidies, the
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CDC began to confront political opposition from former SUN "targets". For
many years SUN had opposed the activities of one of Somerville's major
developers who was also closely tied to the city's building supervisor and
a substantial number of aldermen. For nearly a year, the Somerville Build-
ing Department held up permits, denied zoning changes and generally stalled
the Walnut Street project. It is common knowledge in Somerville that the
Building Department's actions were encouraged by the developer in order to
"get even" with SUN. Eventually, the project was stalled so long that
increased rates and lost subsidies made the project infeasible.
When faced with political opposition, SUN-CDC staff and some Board
members chose a traditional development of cooperation and private negotia-
tion rather than relying on the political muscle of SUN. At the height of
the controversy, the CDC Director publicly stated at a hearing that the CDC
and SUN were entirely separate organizations. For the staff and leadership
of SUN, this was a terrible mistake and relations between SUN and the CDC
worsened quickly. Unfortunately, the CDC used none of the advantages and
maintained all of the disadvantages of its relationship with SUN. The pro-
ject was never completed and the morale and relationships between the two
organizations were permanently damaged. According to the second Director,
If we had gone in unified as SUN and the SUN-CDC then at least we
could have had strong political unity and some power. I'm not sure
we would have won, because Somerville is a hard nut to crack. But,
at least we would have been unified and that would have alloygd us to
pursue other projects with some sense of unity and strength.
SUN's treasurer, a major leader in the organization and a CDC Board member
recalls with some regret that the CDC made the mistake of not choosing and
sticking to one model; either traditional or confrontational. He believes
that if the CDC played the usual CDC role it should have played carefully
by all the rules. Instead, he claims, sometimes the CDC didn't play by the
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rules and sometimes it did, separating itself from SUN. Thus it had the
worst of both worlds.14
The Walnut Street experience also sheds some light on what type of
projects might not be desireable for a community organizing group. The
Walnut Street properties were chosen after a local block club brought them
to the attention of SUN and the CDC. By the time of the last hearing on
the project, only one local resident came out to testify and she opposed
the project. What had transpired? First, once the development began, the
CDC made no effort to maintain communication with organizers or local resi-
dents so that relations became strained. The biggest problem however, was
that once the CDC purchased the buildings, it became a landlord. When the
project was stalled, the code and health violations in the buildings became
the responsibility of the CDC. In this way a community organization became
the target of tenant anger which at one point led to the tragic irony of a
rent strike against the CDC organized with the help of SUN members.
Another project specific problem faced by the CDC was its tendency to
become over ambitious and over commited to projects. According to the
organizational assessment,
... interviews and CDC documents indicate that the CDC generated too
many projects too quickly, and was not able to properly manage all of
them. For example, the business counseling project waned as staff
focused on the troubled Walnut Street project. We recognize the pres-
sures on a CDC to develop a track record quickly, but the number and
scope of projects have not been well matched with the CDC's capabili-
ties.
In addition to "taking on too much too quickly" the CDC did not spend
enough time trying to coordinate projects with the needs of SUN. To some
extent, the priority projects quickly became those which garnered the most
grant support.
In retrospect, most CDC board members believe that they would have
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been better of f if SUN-CDC had maintained much closer relations with SUN
or become a completely independent organization from the beginning. There
is unanimous opinion that a merger with the Somerville Corporation another
local development organization is the desired alternative given the options
but there is regret among SUN leaders that a different approach which com-
bined the CDC's activities with SUN's organizing program and direct politi-
cal confrontation was not given more of a chance.
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Case II
People.Acting.Through Community Effort, PACE, was founded in
1969 by several Alinsky trained organizers who came to Providence at the
behest of several Church and community leaders in primarily black neighbor-
hoods.
The Setting
Providence, Rhode Island, located at the head of Narragansett Bay on
the Providence River is both Rhode Island's largest city and its center of
government. As the industrial and commercial center of the state, it is
also a densely populated city with a largely working class population. In
1970, 13.3 percent of the families in Providence had incomes below the
poverty level. According to the city's Community Development Program, in
1979, 34.9 percent of Providence households could be classified as "very
low income" under Federal Community Services Adminstration guidelines.
Although there has not been any thorough survey of the minority population
since 1970, and 1980 census data is still unavailable a collection of data
sources indicate that by 1980, Providence's Black population was over 10
percent of the city. In the four neighborhoods organized by PACE, nearly
50 percent of the population is Black or Hispanic.1
According to the 1970 census, Providence's population was 179,213. In
1980 this figure had dropped to less than 165,000. The loss of population
during the 1960s and 1970s can largely be attributed to a movement to the
suburbs surrounding Providence. The city's declining population has not
included its minority community which has less access to suburban communi-
ties since 1960. (see study) Recent studies indicate that the flow of
minorities, both Black and Hispanic into the city is much larger than the
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outflow. The combined Black and Hispanic populations make up nearly 20
percent of the city's population. 2
PACE
PACE is part of the NETCCO, New England Training Center for Community
Organizers, network of community organizations which were kegun in the late
1960s by trainees of Saul Alinsky. Because of its Alinsky style, PACE's
basic organizing unit is the block club. Each of the organizations four
neighborhoods (Washington Park was added in 1978) had between 4 and 8 block
clubs which were organized separately by PACE organizers until they reached
"maturity" at which tine a neighborhood organizing committee consisting of
all the block clubs would come together to work on neighborhood issues. As
a former organizer explained, "PACE is an organization of organizations."
We'd bring in almost anyone. We brought in the Girl Scouts, the CAP
agencies, and any other group which wanted to affiliate with us.
Though we organized our own block clubs, we were really a coalition
and any organization could become part of our annual Congress and
help choose action priorities, as long as they signed up five dele-
gates. 3 This structure gave us a lot of freedom to spin off organiza-
tions.
In organizational terms, PACE was devoted to institutionalizing their
organization into solid community groups. To this end they quickly brought
in a majority of Church pastors as PACE leaders and helped the churches
learn toactivate their membership. Where there weren't institutions, PACE
would start them. In one neighborhood they began a Black business associa-
tion which still exists as an organization. In another neighborhood they
began a food cooperative and a neighborhood youth program which is now
self sufficient.
PACE chose its issues in a classic Alinsky fashion. As one organizer
explained,
Our philosophy is that organizing is good in itself. People will
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organize, but only when it is in their self interest. Ultimately,
organizing in direct action will give people a sense of their own 4power. That's our ultimate goal; to give people some real power.
Like other Alinsky style organizations, PACE worked on a wide variety
of issues. Many of the block clubs worked on street level issues like
crime prevention, street lights, and sidewalk and street repair. Other
block clubs worked on larger city wide or even state wide issues such as
discrimination in the school system and welfare reform. Though the organi-
zation never became directly involved in providing services, it did play a
major part in establishing service institutions like food cooperatives and
juvenile programs as well as community economic development organizations.
At its 1979 Congress, PACE turned out 750 delegates who represented
well over 2,000 members. To this day the organization maintains an incred-
ible reputation for being a truly grass roots and powerful organization.
With a large pool of extremely talented leaders and organizers PACE gained
city wide respect and at times even national press attention. Though cer-
tain neighborhood leaders, particularly in the more affluent neighborhoods
never fully accepted PACE's militant direct action style, they commanded
great respect in lower income neighborhoods and were accepted as part of
the political scene by others.
In recent years, PACE has begun to disintegrate and lose much of it
membership. The reasons for this are complicated but have little to do
with the establishment of development institutions described below. In
fact, according to one long time PACE leader, the organization's inability
to generate creative solutions to neighborhood problems was one cause of
its loss of leadership.5 PACE's staff hesitancy to maintain closer ties
to the development organizations it developed and spun off may be one of
the reasons it was unable to maintain the interest of neighborhood leaders.
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Not to be discounted is internal staff and leadership problems. One
block club leader grew to dominate the organization and alienated many
other leaders as they vied for power.
At the same time the leadership began fighting, the organization suf-
fered the loss of some key staff people. The combination of staff and lea-
dership burnout and a general lack of direction has left a much weakened
organization. Today PACE is struggling to redefine its goals and rebuild
itself.
PACE's Move to Development
When PACE began organizing in 1969, its target neighborhoods, South
Providence, the West End and Elmwood had the highest concentrations of Pro-
vidence's minority communities and socio-economic problems. For the South
Providence and Elmwood neighborhoods particularly, housing was by far the
most serious neighborhood problem. According to a 1975 census of housing
conditions, 42 percent of the housing units in South Providence were in
need of serious repair. 31.6 percent fell into this category in the West
End and 26 percent in Elmwood.6 Touring through these neighborhoods today
provides an illustration of neighborhoods which have gone through serious
disinvestment and deterioration.
Two of the primary causes of housing deterioration in the PACE neigh-
borhoods were arson and abandonment. Slum landlords in Providence would
purchase old houses at low prices and maintain them with the minimum level
of repair while charging astronomical rents. When rising costs began to
squeeze landlords' profits they simply abandoned their properties or burned
then to collect insurance premiums. Until 1975, PACE's response to the
housing crisis was to force the city to demolish buildings to prevent fur-
ther damage from arson. It did not take the organization long to realize
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that demolition, while a relatively easy solution was leaving the neighbor-
hoods with ugly vacant lots. An alternative was desperately needed.
SWAP: Stop Wasting Abandoned Property
SWAP began in the Spring of 1975 when a PACE block club in the Elmwood
neighborhood organized to save a vandalized and burned three decker. 7
Prior to this time, PACE used pressure on the city to demolish properties
which were abandoned or burned but the overabundance of vacant lots pre-
sented a major health and safety problem for the neighborhood. In an
attempt to move beyond the simple solution of demolition, a housing com-
mittee was established within PACE to explore methods of securing buildings
and finding new owners who would buy and rehabilitate them. In June 1976
Providence's Mayor announced that the city would raze 100 buildings in
various neighborhoods to prevent arson over the July 4th weekend. Block
club leaders from PACE, the'early homesteaders and community leaders inter-
vened and demanded an end to widespread demolition and its replacement with
the securing of buildings and a homesteading program. In that year, Com-
munity Development funds were set aside and a homesteading program was
established with SWAP as the administrator.
During the Summer of 1976, SWAP was "spun off" from PACE and became
a separate organization with its own bylaws and corporate status. However,
SWAP took much of PACE's style and its membership. The first executive
director and community liason were former PACE organizers who wanted to try
their hands at development. Many of the first SWAP board members were also
PACE leaders and their connections to the two organizations were close.
It is difficult to be certain how closely PACE's organizing was rela-
ted to the development tasks of SWAP. According to the current Director
of SWAP, some PACE staff were dead set against being too close to develop-
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ment work and essentially forced the leaders who went to SWAP to act
alone.8 However, it is clear that this was not a leadership drain for
PACE since many of the early SWAP leaders had become tired of the limita-
tions of direct action organizations and wanted to attempt development.
At least until 1980 when PACE began to disintegrate, SWAP was an
actively grass roots organization with working relationships with PACE and
other community organizations. According to a SWAP staff person;
SWAP is very leadership intensive. Our leaders were used to confron-
tational politics from their work with PACE so in the early days at
least we (staff) relied on the leadership to do much of the work.
But, after we beat up the banks and the city to get our programs we
became much more staff intensive and bureacratic. You don't need
direct action once you get the programs set up; in fact it is more of
a hindrance. But in a lot 9f ways we still have a very active grass
roots membership and board.
A former PACE organizer recalled having a good working relationship with
SWAP and other community development organizations like the Neighborhood
Housing Service.
We weren't in touch every day but our organizers did keep in touch
with them when we were doing housing work. When we did an action on
a landlord we tried to coordinate it with SWAP. They also came in as
a member of the PACE Congress and brought their membership. When we
did our turn out right for actions and the Coygress, we'd call SWAP
and the NHS and they'd turn out their people.
SWAP is one of the most successful neighborhood sweat equity programs
in the country. In their six years of existance they have helped nearly
100 individuals and families find abandoned homes, buy the properties, and
secure financing for rehabilitation. Their Board of Directors consists of
50 percent homesteaders, 25 percent community leaders and 25 percent repre-
sentatives of the private and public sectors. This board is SWAP's direct
link to the community and their "eyes and ears" which are so necessary to
identify disinvested property before it is destroyed. In addition to this
board, SWAP maintains a staff of six which includes a Director, a rehabili-
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tation specialist and an arson researcher.
SWAP picked homesteading as a conscious housing strategy over other
development programs such as rental housing or cooperatives. SWAP leaders
and staff believe that in order to turn their neighborhoods around they
have to encourage home ownership and sweat equity does this in the most
dedicated way. SWAP was very clear early on in its history that it would
keep housing prices low not through subsidized rental programs which would
make them the landlords but through sweat equity. Acknowledging that not
everyone can perform sweat equity, SWAP supports a variety of homesteading
projects which range in their level of sweat participation from approxi-
mately 20 percent to 95 percent of the total work. Some former home-
steaders have even gone on to become small contractors and now help other
homesteaders reclaim abandoned houses.
High interest rates and higher materials costs have hurt SWAP's pro-
gram in recent years. In response, the organization has taken two new
directions. Two years ago they applied for and received a UDAG grant which
covers one-third of the rehabilitation costs for their sweat equity pro-
jects. Their second change was to expand their political work to tackle
the problems of arson which destroys many of the buildings they would like
to homestead.
In one sense SWAP has come full circle from the days when it was
closely tied to the work of PACE. After a number of years of advocacy
oriented development when the organization "beat up" banks and landlords
to set up their program, SWAP shifted into a less activist, more develop-
ment oriented mode. Now, when their style of development is restricted by
economic conditions, they have shifted once again to a combination of poli-
tical organizing and development. SWAP has been able to make this shift
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both because of its grass roots structure and its recent choice of pri-
marily legislative political activity against arson and for tax abatements
which does not impinge upon its development work.
In addition to their neighborhood board, SWAP has maintained a "home-
steaders co-op" which is made up of former and current homesteaders who
came through the SWAP program. The homesteaders' co-op exists as a semi-
autonomous organization within SWAP. Over the last six years it has
engaged in a number of activities including a tool and materials coopera-
tive, homesteading workshops, and technical assistance. In addition the
co-op has functioned as a political force when the occasion arose. In
SWAP's early days, tax arrears on abandoned properties made many home-
steading projects infeasible. The coop, working as a lobbying group worked
to develop and finally institute a city ordinance which allowed for a tax
abatement program for abandoned property. When PACE held its Congresses
or needed support for their campaigns, it was the co-op which provided
the troops. What is unique about the homesteaders' co-op is that it pro-
vided a support and action network for those who benefited from SWAP's ser-
vices, thus guaranteeing that they would not just slip in to anonomity
while enjoying the service.
Members of SWAP's co-op are active in the organization's current
efforts to win arson prevention legislation in the Rhode Island State House.
Rather than carrying out door to door organizing which SWAP staff cannot do
for lack of time and resources, it has organized a coalition of co-op mem-
bers, block club leaders, Community Development groups and other community
organization leaders to lobby at the state house. SWAP's choice of methods,
lobbying rather than direct action, does not hurt their development efforts,
and their reliance on a coalition rather than direct membership mobiliza-
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tion allows the organization to spend time building a political consti-
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tuency.
While SWAP has been able to put together a coalition for their lobby-
ing efforts, the group is small and relatively quiet while the bills they
are advocating are controversial and may require substantially more muscle
in order to win. SWAP's staff person responsible for the arson work
laments that PACE is not still strong because she believes that SWAP "can't
really organize" and these issues lend themselves to direct action groups
like PACE. Legislative work, believe SWAP staff, provides a perfect oppor-
tunity for a direct action organization to complement the work of a devel-
opment organization without antagonizing their development partners.
Unfortunately, PACE is not in a position to take advantage of this oppor-
tunity. 12
Elmwood Neighborhood Housing Services and the PRC
PACE's membership, while primarily low income, did include a substan-
tial number of moderate income homeowners. For this constituency, SWAP's
homesteading has little appeal since they already had their homes which in
many cases were in serious need of repair. To meet the needs of moderate
income members in marginal neighborhoods, PACE initiated a neighborhood
housing service, NHS, in 1979.
Unlike SWAP, the NHS consisted entirely of homeowners, local bankers
and businessment, and "community leaders". Funded by a HUD grant (which
was proposed by PACE staff) the NHS operates programs to secure low
interest loans for home improvement, counsel homeowners on rehabilitation,
and develop neighborhood revitalization strategies. The NHS, which is
still a vital organization in the Elmwood neighborhood, has a large member-
ship and has had a major effect on the image of the neighborhood.
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A PACE vice president who is also a leader in the NHS reflected on the
relationship between PACE, SWAP and the NHS.
We needed all three organizations. SWAP is important but it wasn't
for people like me who own their own homes. PACE was like an umbrella.
It started all of these development groups which were spinoffs but a
lot of us were on all of the boards and we'd work with SWAP whenever
we could. I don't think the NHS ro SWAP drained leadership from PACE.
PACE worked on all the neighborhood issues and drew in leaders that
were interested in those issues. The NHS and SWAP provided housing
and it attracted people who needed housing and so wTge more interested
in "development". We needed all the organizations.
Another PACE spinoff is the People's Redevelopment Corporation (PRC)
which no longer operates. PRC existed primarily to supervise and plan the
construction of federally subsidized elderly housing. PRC was establihsed
as a community development corporation, completely separate from PACE,
though one of PACE's strongest leaders eventually became a staff person for
PRC. Unfortunately, PRC did not build the kind of organizational base
built by SWAP and when it finished its elderly housing project did not move
on to other housing programs.
Lessons from Providence: Problems and Successes
In many ways, PACE's development experience is a success story in how
a direct action community organization can successfully institutionalize
victories and carry out development activities. Although PACE's recent
organizing history has been rife with problems, there are a number of les-
sons to be learned from the PACE development experience. Many of the staff
and leadership problems faced by PACE have little or nothing to do with the
establishment of SWAP and NHS. However, several PACE leaders and SWAP
staff believe that PACE lost leadership and membership because the organi-
zers were unable to move beyond their traditional Alinsky direct action
style to develop a more comprehensive program suited to the current needs
of neighborhood residents. Ironically, the development organizations
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established by PACE are sophisticated examples of how an organizing group
might expand its program and base of support., Unfortunately, PACE was so
careful to spin off its development organizations that it did little to
build close working relations with its spinoffs. In part this was due to
the need for autonomy on the part of SWAP and the NHS but it was also due
to PACE staff suspicion of the compatibility of organizing and development.
This is particularly unfortunate because now that SWAP needs political
clout for its legislation, PACE has no real strength. If PACE staff had
been more careful to build working relationships with SWAP, their work with
absentee landlords could have continued to complement SWAP's homesteading,
and they might have been able to effectively lobby around arson issues.
These were missed opportunities.
There are a variety of reasons why SWAP and NHS were successful exam-
ples of development organizations with ties to direct action organizations.
These are both organizational and project specific issues. Though SWAP's
distance from PACE eventually grew large, its autonomy, guaranteed by its
spin off form was crucial to its success. All of the SWAP staff and PACE
organizers agree that while there were many places where the pressure of
PACE was instrumental to SWAP victories, SWAP had to be independent to
work with the banks and developers. In many cases, PACE could act as the
"club" on a bank or landlord and then SWAP could come in claiming organi-
zational independence and negotiate a way out for the "target". As the
current director of SWAP explained, "not being PACE helped us. We could
play a middle role between the banks and the neighborhood."
A second organizational lesson is SWAP's successful efforts to estab-
lish an organization for the people they served. By continuing the home-
steader's involvement through the co-op, SWAP guaranteed that they would
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not become an individualized service organization. Additionally, they
were able to build a political base which they could draw on when neces-
sary. If PACE still remained a force, a coalition between PACE activists
and the homesteaders' cooperative would have been a strong political force.
SWAP's ability to move to a new sphere of activity- legislative lobby-
ing- provided the organization a creative way to maintain an activist base
without jeopardizing the allies which were crucial to their development
work. This ability to adapt to changing circumstances is what makes SWAP
a vital organization while PACE struggles to maintain its old style.
A central project specific lesson provided by the work of SWAP, the
Elmwood NHS, and the PRC is that tenure can be critical political issues
when doing community based housing development. SWAP very consciously
chose homesteading to encourage home ownership and avoid the organizational
problems of rental property. This was also true for NHS which could main-
tain an active base of grass roots support because homeowners saw the NHS
as their organization, rather than as a landlord or a developer from the
outside.
PACE's failure to maintain itself as a viable community organization
in the 1980s had little to do with its community economic development
efforts. To a large extent, PACE's problems can be attributed to internal
crises; high staff turnover and individual leadership domination. Some
observers argue that PACE may have outlived its purpose and the development
organizations it spawned are the fruits of PACE's efforts, and the final
evidence of its success. Others argue that many of the problems PACE once
confronted still remain in Providence and require direct political action
to gain remedies. PACE's failure to adapt to changing times and neighbor-
hood needs may have been responsible for some membership and leadership
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losses. It may be that PACE's success was also its failure. So successful
was PACE at spinning off development organizations that it was unable to
reap the organizational benefits of being tied to development organizations
because the separation was so great.
However, though PACE is faltering, it has created two viable develop-
ment organizations with grass roots participation. PACE's experience
indicate that direct action community organizing can exist side by side
with community economic development and that both activities can be
mutually supporting.
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Case III
This case :study concerns Worcester Is Saving Energy (WISE), a weather-
ization project funded under the Massachusetts low income weatherization
program and administered by Worcester Fair Share, the Worcester Labor
Co-op and the Worcester County Extension Service. WISE is an interesting
example of a community organizing group which directly applied its tech-
niques to the delivery of services. WISE was both a successful weatheriza-
tion program and a valuable organizing tool.
The Setting
With over 170,000 residents, Worcester is the second largest city in
New England. Once the steel-making center of the country, Worcester is
still a manufacturing city but has suffered many of the symptoms of North-
east urban decay. Worcester's housing stock is old and in many sections
of the city is badly deteriorated. Hundreds of housing units are abandoned
and secured even though the vacancy rate is substantially less than five
percent.
In Worcester, over 8,500 families receive federally subsidized fuel
assistance. Yet, until 1980, less than twenty percent of Worcester homes
were insulated. Subsidized heat was literally seeping through the city's
walls.
Worcester Fair Share
Worcester Fair Share was established in 1977-1978 as part of Massa-
chusetts Fair Share, a state wide citizens' action organization with over
80,000 members and 60 chapters in 12 cities. Massachusetts Fair Share
which was founded in 1974, has its roots in the new Citizen Action move-
ment (see Chapter 2) and combines traditional community organizing with
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an Alinsky style and an anti-corporate, consumerist approach. Massachu-
setts Fair Share's campaigns have ranged from abandoned property improve-
ment and street repairs on the local level to tax reform, hazardous
wastes and utility rate reform on the state wide level. In the last two
years, Fair Share has sought to expand both its program and its funding
sources through the development of service oriented and "development" pro-
grams. These experiments have ranged from a state wide weatherization
business to a housing development program. In the Winter of 1980-1981,
Worcester Fair Share, along with two other local organizations began
administering a unique version of Massachusetts' federally funded wea-
therization program.
Worcester Fair Share consists of five chapters with over 1,000
members. Like other Fair Share chapters, the Worcester organization works
on both block issues like sidewalk repair and on a city wide level such as
their recent campaign to overturn Proposition 2 . For the past several
years, Worcester Fair Share's primary concern in almost all of its neigh-
borhoods has been housing. Housing campaigns have taken a variety of
forms. In 1979, Worcester had one of the highest arson rates in the
state and Fair Share organized to identify potential arsoned buildings,
pressure banks and insurance companies which were financing "arson prone"
landlords, and to force the city to have an improved arson watch program.
Other housing campaigns included pressure on a number of landlords
to pay their delinquent property taxes, repair their code violations, and
install smoke alarms. In the past year, Worcester Fair Share initiated a
campaign to save Worcester's housing stock, particularly its ever shrinking
supply of rental housing. This campaign includes pressure for rent con-
trol. Another is an attempt to save housing stock through non-profit
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development efforts.'
Throughout the 1970s, Worcester Fair Share was exclusively a direct
action advocacy organization. Because of its style and power in the com-
munity, the organization was viewed as a threat by many of the traditional
social service agencies and relations between Fair Share and many of the
neighborhood centers was poor at best. Likewise, many Fair Shar leaders
viewed the social service agencies with suspicion and criticized them for
their unwillingness to confront the city administration.
Fair Share's Move to Service Delivery
In 1979 and 1980, the state office of Community Development (EOCD)
was administering its federally funded weatherization program almost
exclusively through Community Action Agencies. In Worcester the program
was administered through the Community Action Coalition, the city's CAA.
Like many of the CAAs, the Community Action Coalition had high overhead
costs and was not terribly successful in reaching low income residents with
information and weatherization "kits". In December of 1980, EOCD deter-
mined that CAC was no longer responsibly delivering weatherization ser-
vices to Worcester residents and decided to solicit competing proposals.
Because of a close contact in EOCD, Massachusetts Fair Share was
approached and asked to submit a proposal to administer the weatherization
program and deliver weatherization kits to low income households. Even-
tually, three Fair Share chapters became involved in the weatherization
program - Worcester, Lynn and Springfield - but the Worcester program was
the most successful.
Although Worcester Fair Share has a strong membership base in the com-
munity, its alienation from the social service community and its lack of
experience in delivering services meant that Fair Share could not admin-
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ister the weatherization program alone. In order to qualify as administra-
tors, Fair Share assembled a coalition of organizations including the Wor-
cester County Extension Service and the Worcester Labor Co-op, two service
oriented groups that had better relations with Fair Share than the CAAs
and neighborhood centers. Their agreement was that WCES would train people
to run and supervise the workshops and deliver the weatherization kits to
eligible households. The Labor Co-op was given the responsibility of
administering the the program, a role which was unfortunately hastily and
unclearly defined. Worcester Fair Share assumed the task of going door to
door and organizing neighborhood institutions to get low income residents
to the workshops.
Two important components made Worcester's weatherization program
unique and appropriate for Fair Share's style of community organization.
First, rather than waiting for families to approach them for assistance,
Fair Share staff went door to door to speak to thousands of people about
the program. Staff used their contacts with church, civic groups and
senior clubs to turn out residents to workshops held in their own church
or hall. Fair Share insisted that if they were to adminster the program,
their organizers could use the door to door contact and the workshops as
an opportunity to solicit involvement and membership in Worcester Fair
Share.
Combining Fair Share's organizing techniques with service delivery
proved to be remarkably successful, from a service delivery point of view.
During the first year of the program WISE staff spoke to nearly 2,500
Worcester residents about conservation measures and distributed 1,500 wea-
therization kits in income eligible households. By the end of the year,
WISE had spoken to more people and delivered more kits than any weatheri-
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zation program in the state.
Due to bureacratic delays, the WISE program wasn't able to start
until the end of January, 1981. Even with a late start, outreach workers
and workshop leaders had no trouble reaching residents.
Preparation continued at a feverish pitch. W.I.S.E. outreach workers
doorknocked the entire neighborhood with W.I.S.E. flyers, announcing
the meeting. Interested people were given a reminder call. The
workshop was rehearsed and the kits were readied. When the 27th
finally arrived, all the fears about the late start-up and the lack
of preparation time were put to rest... Over 60 of the residents of
the neighborhood around the Green Is land Neighborhood showed up to
learn how to weatherize their homes.
The first workshop was followed by almost 90 others (often four a day).
Using existing community networks, the workshops were held at neighborhood
centers, churches, senior centers, canmunity schools, Elk lodges, and in
Hispanic centers where they were carried on in Spanish. Though the wea-
therization kits were exclusively for low income residents, people of all
income levels attended the workshops to get information about weatheriza-
tion techniques.
In March, when the end of winter made it more difficult to elicit
interest in the workshops, W.I.S.E. turned to community agencies for
assistance. W.I.S.E. trained social service agencies to lead workshops
and the kits were distributed through this new network.
The W.I.S.E. program proved to be not only quality service delivery
but a good organizing program as well. At each of the four or five meet-
ings, nearly 25 people received the Fair Share membership pitch. Accord-
ing to one Fair Share organizer, they were able to solicit three or four
new memberships at each meeting which means that the program increased the
membership by about 300 people.
Though memberships solicited through W.I.S.E. were not consciously
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integrated into Fair Share's organizing program until the second year of
WISE, all of the organizers made use of the additional contact with neigh-
borhood residents. Both at the doors and in workshops, Fair Share staff
described state wide utility reform campaigns and their "stop big oil"
campaign. According to all of the organizers, involved with Fair Share at
the time, members recruited through WISE were often integrated into Fair
Share action projects. When organizers had neighborhood chapter meetings,
at which high turnout was expected, they would coordinate their work with
WISE outreach workers to get Fair Share materials to all the doors. 4
WISE I helped Fair Share's organizing in a number of important ways.
Fair Share membership received special mailings from the organization
announcing the program and explaining how members could qualify to receive
weatherization kits. Many Fair Share members attended workshops and accord-
ing to several organizers, Fair Share's reputation among the membership was
strengthened by distributing tangible material benefits to the membership.
In addition to building the membership and potential membership base,
WISE I was instrumental in building up staff morale, expertise and resour-
ces. At the time the program began, other Fair Share staffs were embroiled
in internal conflict which was sapping the organization's strength and
stifling program development. WISE offered the Worcester staff a concrete
program that gave a clear focus to their work. While lacking focus is no
reason to undertake a service program, it indicates the positive effect
that such a successful city wide effort can have on staff as well as mem-
bers. In addition to providing a concrete program, WISE also offered the
Worcester Fair Share staff monetary resources which they would otherwise
not have had since WISE covered Fair Share's office costs and payed for
additional door to door outreach.
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A third important aspect of WISE was that it provided training for
future Fair Share organizers. At the present time, three WISE outreach
workers are full time organizers on the Worcester Fair Share staff.
WISE I was followed in 1980/81 and in 1981/82 by WISE II and WISE III.
Each of these programs varied slightly from the previous one and added to
the growing understanding of service delivery on the part of Fair Share.
WISE II faced the problem of expanding the program to reach households that
were not responding to leaflets, publicity and doorknocking. Rather than
just relying on the existing service networks, WISE workers trained neigh-
borhood residents to run workshops in their own homes to which they could
invite their neighbors. This tactic closely mirrored Fair Share's house
meetings in which neighborhood residents would invite their friends and
neighbors to their homes to hear about the work of Fair Share. WISE III
added even a further level of neighborhood penetration by enlisting organi-
zations like the Boy Scouts who made special appointments with residents
who could not leave their homes to go to workshops.
By the time WISE II and III were underway, Fair Share staff had
learned to use the program consciously in their organizing strategy. One
WISE outreach worker who later became a Fair Share organizer used the
WISE meeting lists to contact people for her chapter meeting. Last win-
ter, dozens or residents who were involved in WISE workshops were integra-
ted into Worcester Fair Share's energy committee to work on utility rate
reform and other related issues. This year that same committee is pressur-
ing Commonwealth Gas-through direct action and negotiations to fund a wea-
therization program which will be available to all residents, regardless of
their incomes. 5
Problems with the WISE Program
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Though WISE is a remarkahle example of the benefits of combining
organizing and service delivery, the program was not without its problems.
The snags encountered by the WISE staff and their solutions are instructive
for others attempting to reproduce the model or something like it.
Perhaps the most important quality of the WISE program from an organi-
zer's perspective is that the service delivery was relatively simple and
fast. Workshops were one time affairs and most people left with a self
contained package that required no follow up on the part of the staff.
Unlike many programs like fuel assistance or income maintenance, staff
were not tied to clients on a long term basis. WISE and Fair Share staff
believed that if the program were much more complicated, it would have
been less appropriate to Fair Share's style of organizing.
A danger that any service organization faces is that government agen-
cies often encounter delays and force local agencies to wait until pro-
blems are ironed out. Unfortunately, when there are delays on the. state
or federal level, local service-organizations generally take the blame for
something which is out of their control. At least at the beginning of the
program, delays hurt its credibility and there is some concern that such
delays could happen again. One solution offered by organizers is to
mobilize potential recipients of weatherizaton assistance to demand faster
action on the part of state officials.
Another problem faced by service delivery organizations is the neces-
sity to follow state or federal income guidelines which can be cumbersome
and hinder organizing. Fortunately, Worcester Fair Share was able to
insist upon and receive a relatively lenient income certification process.
Rather than having to prove their income levels through forms and paper-
work, potential recipients merely had to state their income on a sheet of
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paper and WISE workers assumed that information was correct. In Lynn,
where another Fair Share weatherization program was sponsored, the income
guidelines were much. higher and recipients bad to prove through documenta-
tion that they were entitled to receive a weatherization kit. Not sur-
prisingly the Lynn program was far less successful that WISE and was not
received as well by organizers.
An additional problem often faced by organizations like Fair Share,
which are new to the service delivery world is the resistance put up by
the existing and traditional service organizations. In Worcester, careful
coalition building and close attention to organization turf prevented
major resentments which can destroy a program. However, even with all of
their attention, one of the three primary participants in the program, the
Worcester Labor Co-op, strongly protested Fair Share's recruitment efforts
through the WISE workshops to.the state, even though this arrangement was
agreed upon by all parties. In retrospect some WISE staff feel that roles
in the coalition of sponsors should have been more carefully spelled out
before the program began.
A warning given by a number of former WISE staff is that this type of
program tends to divert staff time from other issues and the day to day
rudiments of chapter building. When WISE I began this wasn't a problem
since that staff badly needed a program which offered direction and con-
crete activities. However, at times during WISE I and II, say former
staff, the program diverted staff time from other organizing projects.
One simple solution to this problem is to ensure that there are sufficient
staff with clearly delineated roles who can operate the service project.
In some cases it may be useful to spin off the service project just as an
organization might spin off a CDC. The- problem is coordinating organizing
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and service delivery while preventing .the service delivery, which can be
overwhelming, from totally dominating the organization's work.
WISE staff members agree almost unanimously that the program's bene-
fits outweighed its problems. At the current time, Fair Share is explor-
ing ways to establish a permanent energy service component which can
relate to Fair Share chapter work but function as a separate organization.
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Worcester Planning Department., Facts About Worcester, (1980)
2Worcester Fair Share: manuscript
3WISE Staff, A Report to the Community: WISE is Saving Energy, 1980.
4Ibid. p. 5.
Interview, April, 1982, with WISE staff.
6 Ibid
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CONCLUSION
Though community economic development is a necessary undertaking in
order for some community organizations to survive over a long period of
time, there is no guarantee that the combination of the two activities
will be easy or smooth. From available history and the case studies
included in this study, certain tensions between organizing and develop-
ment can be identified. These tensions will manifest themselves differ-
ently in different contexts, depending upon the nature of the community,
the experience of the organization, and the personalities of staff and
leadership.
1) Conflicting demands upon limited resources: Both development
and organizing require leadership and staff time as well as fiduciary
resources. Development can be complicated work and often requires sub-
stantial staff attention which might otherwise be applied to organizing
projects. Likewise, leadership time is limited since leaders will be
"burned out" if they are overextended. Development activities require
extended and intense attention from community leaders unless the work is
carried out entirely by staff. Many organizations fear that development
activities will drain their leadership resources and tie them up in com-
plicated and drawn out activities.
Particularly in the early stages of development, at least some core
financial support is necessary for success. Though some economic develop-
ment projects can, over the long run, be self-sufficient or even generate
cash, none can avoid start up financial requirements. In periods when
community organizations are struggling to find economic support for their
organizing activities, development activities may compete with organizing'
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for limited foundation grants, government funds, and private donations.
2) Providing different signals to outside institutions: Most organ-
izing efforts utilize a confrontational strategy in which elected leader-
ship and. traditional community institutions such as banks and corporations
are established as "targets" for community demands. Development on the
other hand requires cooperation and mediation with community institutions
in order to guarantee the success of development proj'ects. Thus a commun-
ity organization which carries out development gives different and often
conflicting signals to "outside" institutions. This dynamic may cause the
development leaders or staff to try to temper the confrontational activi-
ties of the organizers or it may cause the organizers to confront commun-
ity institutions rather than negotiate a solution when there are problems
in the development process.
3) Teaching differen't lessons: One of the fundamental principles of
community organizing is that confrontational mobilization teaches commun-
ity members that their collective action gives them power to win economic
and political power. This is a lesson that organizers constantly strive
to teach and it may take precedence over the specific issue at hand.
Development, on the other hand, teaches community leaders that cooperation,
negotiation, and technical expertise win economic benefits for communities
and thus solve neighborhood problems. Whereas most community organizers
see community problems as systematic and work to teach leaders the same
lesson, community development tends to reinforce the idea that short term
economic gains is sufficient change.
4) Changing class relations: Community economic development often
brings with it the responsibilities of ownership and management and thus
may fundamentally alter the class relations between the community organi-
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zation and community residents. Rental property is perhaps the- best exam-
ple. Many community organizations are encouraged to purchase and then
rent property to take buildings from absentee control. However, once a
community organization becomes a landlord, it must collect the rent, main-
tain the buildings (often a difficult task), and even evict tenants if
necessary. No matter how well intentioned a community organization may
be, it is nearly impossible to be both a landlord and to organize tenants.
5) Timing the development process: Community organizers depend on
a relatively short time horizon and having control over the timing of
events in order to best mobilize community residents. Development is
often a long process in which many of its components are beyond the con-
trol of the community developer. Since timing is so important for the
work of the organizer, the need for patience during the development pro-
cess may create tensions in an organization trying to combine both activi-
ties.
These central tensions arise in the work of nearly every community
organization attempting to undertake development activities. The next
section draws on the experiences of several- community organizations and
offers some lessons for organizations to ease or eliminate these tensions.
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Typical Problems and Suggestions from the Field
One of the most trenchant conclusions which can be drawn from the
history and cases presented in the preceding chapters is that there are
no simple formulas for the complicated process of combining community eco-
nomic development and community organizing. Whil-e there is no scientific
basis for establishing which approaches will work and which won't, there
is a wealth of field experience and history from which we can draw a num-
ber of conclusions about typical problems and successful responses. Much
of the history of CDCs and community organizing is written and I have
drawn heavily from available sources for the earlier chapters. Recent
field experiences are also recorded both in the original cases in this
study and in a recently released study by the Center for Community
Change. The Center's study, performed by four experienced organizers and
developers examined over thirty community organizations to draw some con-
clusions about what works and fails when community organizations undertake
development activities. Several short case studies from the CCC report
are included in the appendix. I have drawn heavily from the materials
presented in the CCC study in developing the conclusions reached in this
final chapter. By in large, the conclusions reached in the CCC study
substantiate the conclusions drawn from my own cases and the historical
materials.
One of the problems of generalizing principles from case studies is
that many of the difficulties faced by community organizations undertaking
d-evelopment are a function of personality, timing, or. other non-quantifi-
able factors. What works for an organization in Baltimore or Providence
may not work for an organization in Somerville or Cleveland. Nevertheless,
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there is enough recorded corraborative information that presenting some
general principles is a useful exercise. Clearly, each organization which
undertakes development activities will have to carefully examine its own
needs before it decides how to proceed.
This chapter is organized into a typology of problems which have
faced typical community organizations undertaking economic development
activities and organizing strategies. Following a description of each typi-
cal problem is one or more suggestions drawn from the historical and case
materials as to how to deal with the problem. Though many of these sug-
gestions have been developed or utilized by successful organizations,
there is no obviously.precise correlation between the use of the strate-
gies espoused below and the ultimate success of an organization. There
is however evidence which suggests many of the typical problems presented
here may be avoided by paying some heed to the suggestions provided from
experience.
Start-up Problems
1) Prerequisites for the start-up
Almost all community organizations undertaking development point to
timing as a key to long term success. According to the CCC study, four
prerequisites should exist before undertaking development: capacity,
resources, credibility with the outside world and credibility inside the
community. Community organizations should carefully examine the reasons
they are moving to development. The availability- of grant money is not
sufficient reason nor is the desire to achieve self-sufficiency. The move
to development should be a logical process growing out of the need to
expand the organization's strategy and activities. Before making such a
decision it is important that the organization have the internal resources
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to undertake what can be a complicated activity.
Capacity is difficult to measure because it involves many non-quanti-
fiable human factors. Leadership development is-key and means that an
organization's leaders are experienced, well rooted in the organization,
committed to the organizing goals of the organization and willing and able
to learn the complicated tasks involved in carrying out development.
Capacity also means that an organization has a solid sense of its goals
and knows why it seeks a development strategy.
Resources: It is absolutely critical that the community organization
be able to lend core support to the development effort in the first stages.
Though development work may generate its own revenues over the long run,
in at least the first year the parent organization should be willing to
provide office space, staff and leadership time assistance in fundraising,
and perhaps even direct financial assistance. All of this means that an
organization facing financial crises should think carefully before under-
taking a development project.
Outside credibility: What is often called a "track record" or proven
experience can be an elusive thing for. a -community organization. Because
many community organizations are founded on principles of direct action.
and political mobilization, a traditional "business like" track record is
probably out of the question. However, it is critical that community
organizations have clearly established their political power, must be per-
ceived as representing the "community" and must have the staff, time and
skills to carry out complex programs. While it is unlikely that banks
will line up at the door, an organization must have enough power to garner
response and respect. The SUN case is particularly illustrative of the
problems which occur when an organization does not have enough perceived
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power or technical capabilities. SUN was unable to force Somerville offi-
cials to allow them their building permits and was unable to gain badly
needed time from local banks. Unfortunately, there is no easy solution
to this dilemma except experience and the ability to honestly assess an
organization's stage in development.
Credibility inside the community: Lacking the traditional sources
of economic power, one of the most important resources brought to the
development process by a community organization is broad support by com-
munity residents. At many stages of the development process in any speci-
fic project, local popular power must be brought to bear to move alon a
community project. This requires a community organization to pay careful
attention to structuring their development project in a manner which will
tie in local neighborhood leadership, offer representation for residents
and remain open to democratic input.
2) Planning the move to development
There is consensus among community developers that careful planning
is one key to long term success but that most community organizations do
far too little of it. A first step in planning should be the education
and training of staff, leaders and active members about the various com-
ponents of community economic development. In many areas, planning organ-
izations exist which can offer training assistance and continuing advice.
At the least, leaders, members and staff should go through a series of
meetings and workshops to begin understanding how a neighborhood can plan
and develop their local economy.
Early planning efforts should include assessing the organizational
abilities and timing described above, carefully constructing an organiza-
tional structure vis a vis organizing efforts, specific staff and leader-
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ship roles., and clarifying goals and objectives. It is also important to
carry out a careful assessment of community needs and development priori-
ties. In the ideal world, a long planning study might ensue, but given
most organizations' constraints, at least some type of careful project
selection and prioritization should take place.
The Southeast Community Organization (SECO) in Ba'limore, an organiza-
tion studied by the CCC, undertook an 18 month community wide planning
study before it established its development subsidiary and picked its
first projects. In contrast, SUN-CDC spent very little time developing an
organizational structure and choosing project priorities. SUN-CDC's
structure and an overload of projects were major problems for the organi-
zation.
It should be understood from the outset that time horizons for organ-
izing and development vary substantially. Whereas an organizing campaign
may be a few weeks long, many development projects last for several years.
The planning stage should reflect the difference in scale of complexity.
Many community organizations have planned their move to development for
over a year before actually undertaking specific projects. While this may
be impossible for some community organizations, ~serious planning before
the implementation of projects cannot be stressed enough.
3) Clarifying objectives
When little time is given to planning, organizational objectives
remain undefined. Particularly for advocacy organizations which are
undertaking development, a major shift in emphasis, short and long-term
objectives must be clarified and clearly spelled out. It is clear from a
number of cases that a failure to clarify organizational objectives will
haunt the organization throughout its life and encourage internal divi-
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sions and disorganization. SUN-CDC failed to clearly establish its goals
early on and its Board fought against goals during its entire three years
of existence.
The careful establishment of objectives should begin by- establishing
how deeply an organization wants to plunge into actual development. For
some organizations, participating as a watchdog is appropriate and requires
education and training but not actual project implementation. If an organ-
ization decides to undertake development projects there are certain objec-
tives which should be clarified early on and reviewed regularly.
First, the community organization should establish the relationship
between organizing and development efforts. This involves structural
decisions as well as clarifying philosophies and strategy, all of which
should be recorded in the by-laws or other organizational documents.
Secondly, some realistic expectations should be established for the
type and number of projects which can be undertaken. These goals should
be examined regularly but must be set out clearly and in writing if possi-
ble. Additional components of the objectives setting process will be
elaborated upon below.
4) Choosing a structure
Choosing an appropriate structure for the development arm of a com-
munity organization is perhaps the most hotly debated topic among neighbor-
hood activists undertaking development. Judging from the cases and histor-
ical evidence, the issues deserve this status in the debate since the
structure chosen to do development is a key variable in the success or
failure of community organizations turning to development. There are a
myriad of forms used by community development organizations. For clarify,
the following typology of forms is offered.
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TYPOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
- The creation of an entirely separate development corporation,
fully independent of the community organization with only his-
torical ties.
- The development of two parallel organizations which are for-
mally autonomous but which have one degree or another of
interlocking board membership to maintain the link.
- A parent-child arrangement, in which the development arm is
a subsidiary of, and fully answerable to, the community
organization.
- A single community organization which does not create a
separate entity, but expands its activities to take in
development.
- The utilization of joint development ventures in which a
community organization relies primarily upon other non-pro-
fit organizations to carry out the actual development while
it remains an advocacy and direct action organization.
- A community based organization which evolves into a develop-
ment organization and leaves community organizing behind.
Structural decisions should be very carefully considered and clearly
expressed in writing. A problem faced by SUN-CDC was that the relation-
ship between SUN and the CDC was never clearly established and shifted
from crisis to crisis, creating distrust and an incapacity to act with
strength. In contrast, the Union Myles Community Coalition (see appendix)
created a strict relationship between its organizing and development arms-
and even specified a clear division of labor.
If a community organization decides that it should combine its organ-
izing efforts with a development strategy to create synergistic benefits,
there are certain conclusions which can be drawn from historical and case
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materials. Once a completely se.parate development organization is created,
there is a tendency for that organization to disassociate itself from the
more "radical" parent community organization because the development pro-
cess encourages working through "proper channels" and exercising tradi-
tional forms of power. While a completely separate spin off may initially
appear to benefit the implementation of development projects, the commun-
ity organization is likely to sacrifice organizing strategy which includes
development. These patterns can be seen both in the history of the Alin-
sky development organizations like FIGHTON and in the evolution of SWAP
from PACE in Providence where development spin offs drifted away from the
community organizing group when conscious links were not maintained.
Taking the opposite approach., a community organization may merely
expand its activities to include development without creating a new organi-
zation of any kind. For an organization which chooses to develop one small
project like a single abandoned house, this model is appropriate. However,
if a community organization decides to undertake more complicated projects
or actually plan neighborhood development, the development process becomes
much more complicated and requires some type of new structure. The dis-
advantage of keeping the development activities entirely within the commun-
ity organization is that constraints on the organization may develop such
as requests to limit the militancy of direct action, over-extension of
leadership and staff, and more resistance to specific projects on the part
of local officials and the private sector. If a community organization
seeks to combine the best of organizing and development and undertake sub-
tantial projects, it will probably have the most success with a spin off
organization that retains ties through overlapping boards, shared staff
meetings and shared information and strategizing. For example, The Union
140
Miles Community Coalition in Cleveland has the majority of seats on its
development corporation Board and it By-laws force the development corpor-
ation to contract with. Coalition organizers for- outreach efforts.
Staffing Problems
1) Professional Culture
It can be seen both from both the case materials and the CCC study
that there are specific differences in the training, philosophy, skills
and motivation of professional organizers and professional community
developers. It is clear from cases like SUN-CDC that these differences
can cause substantial tension in community organizations moving to develop-
ment. To quote the CCC study,
The potential for conflict between these two cultures is clear, and
there is substantial evidence of such difficulties in the careers of
many neighborhood organizations which have moved into development.
An organizer's definition of development is frequently very different
from a developer's. Organizers bring people together to reach a con-
sensus, while a developer tends to look for people to come together
to support a project. What are sometimes described as personality
conflicts between staff members may well have their roots in these
basic outlooks.
2) Receiving and sharing technical assistance
Whatever the type of staff a community organization chooses to carry
out development, there is substantial evidence that the staff will need
some technical assistance in their planning and implementation of projects.
In some cases, distrust of professionals leads community organizations to
reject such technical assistance. In other, more common cases, technical
assistance is provided but it often goes only to.staff rather than being
shared with Board members.
A solution to the technical assistance problem is to utilize the
growing network of community consulting organizations. There are a number
of national organizations like the CCC or Community Economics which offer
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training, funding and technical assistance. In Massachusetts, the Commun-
ity Economic Development Assistance Corporation offers both training and
technical assistance for staff and Board members.
3) Staffing criteria
According to Jerry Altman, a consultant to Aetna Life and Casualty
and six community organizations now carrying out development, it is often
better to sacrifice technical expertise and traditional entrepreneurial
characteristics for a staff trusted by local leaders, trained in the
techniques of community organizing and sensitive to the democratic deci-
sion making process. In Altman's experience, the most successful organiza-
tions moving from organizing to include development used staff from the
community or former community organizers trained in development skills.
Solving the staffing problem is not easy but there are certain les-
sons which can be drawn from previous efforts. First a community organi-
zation considering development is more likely to be successful if it does
not hire a staff because of their technical expertise. There is a very
limited pool of people who have both development expertise and experience
in community organizing, and evidence suggests that managerial, not tech-
nical skills are most important for a development director. However,
there is no disputing that technical skills and a solid knowledge of the
"rules" of the development world are indispensible for a young community
organization. One solution to this dilemma is to hire a generalist as
director and bring on technical people as consultants. Another solution
is to develop an advisory committee of local professionals who are willing
to share their expertise with the Board and the staff.
For young organizations, the hiring of organizers or developers
trained as organizers to staff development projects seems to alleviate
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tensions between organizing and development staffs. For older organiza-
tions such as SWAP in Providence, the problem becomes more complicated
as the development organization takes on its own identity and priorit'ies.
One possible solution is to regularly train developmnt staff and leaders
about the goals and tactics of organizing and the specific history and
operations of the parent community organization. A second approach, sug-
gested by SUN leaders, is to establish permanent communication structures
between the development staff and Board and the staff and leaders of the
parent community organization.
Though it nay be downplayed at the outset of a development project,
staff differentials between organizers and developers can be the cause
of tremendous tensions. This of course is not a problem when development
activities are just an extension of the community organization. When a
somewhat autonomous development organization is created, salary differen-
tials, another component of professional culture, can cause great strains.
SUN and SUN-CDC experienced precisely this problem. Community developers
tend to garner higher salaries than organizers because of their profes-
sional training and the accepted professional norm. One solution is to
create a salary structure which reflects training and experience, regard-
less of professional background. Another alternative is to hire organi-
zers as development staff and pay them as such.
Leaderhip Problems
1) ,Building a leadership body
It is fairly typical for community organizations undertaking develop-
ment to assemble a Board consisting of some residents who have development
expertise. In numerous cases, splits have developed between those leaders
with development experience and those without it, Inexperienced Board mem-
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bers may be left out of planning and implementation and ultimately this
can exacerbate tensions between the "professional" developers and the
community organizers and their leadership. This is precisely what hap-
pened to SUN-CDC whose first president was a planning professional with
little organizing experience.. As tensions developed over organizing vs.
development the board split and hastened the organization's crisis. New
Boards can benefit greatly from experienced professional (non-staff) lea-
dership but some steps might be taken to prevent such splits from occur-
ring. First, the development organization might take measures to guaran-
tee seats for neighborhood organizing leaders and representatives from low
income households. Secondly, Boards should go through training in which
development expertise and organizing skills are shared or taught with out-
side assistance.
2) "Losing" leadership to development
Some staff and leaders of community organizations haye expressed fears
that development activities will drain leadership away from organizing
activities. There is no evidence that I have seen to substantiate this
concern. More often than not, some leaders in the community are more
interested in development activities than direct action organizing and
are attracted to such projects. This was PACE's experience when they spun
off SWAP and the Neighborhood Housing Service. More of a problem is link-
ing organizing leadership and development leadership once the development
organization is operating. One solution is to guarantee seats on the
Development Board to community organizing leaders. This type of structure
helps to prevent the reliance of the development organization on higher
income and professional comnunity leaders who may have less experience with.
organizing.
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Another solution to the problem of connecting organizing and develop-
ment leadership is to activate the development leadership around their
own issues. SWAP for example, created a homesteaders cooperative which
consisted of homesteaders who assisted each other and organized around
community issues such as arson, which did not conflict with their develop-
ment agenda. Most community development organizations experience at least
some staff domination of the Board or leadership. This is much more
likely to happen in a development organization where the success of a pro-
ject is more crucial than the development of leadership. In the case of
SUN-CDC, a lack of clear communication between the Director and the Board
led to staff decision making without Board input and was one of the major
causes of that organization's demise.
There are at least two approaches which might help to solve the pro-
blem of staff domination. First, Board training cannot be stressed
enough. Outside assistance can be brought in to help educate Board mem-
bers to the point that they can at least make informed decisions about
development projects. A second approach is to create specific mechanisms
through which staff must comnunicate and work with Board members. In
many development organizations, this seems to work most successfully
through project working committees rather than just-at Board meetings.
However successful these two approaches, it is important to understand that
because of the technical complexity of development, there will be occasions
when staff decisions will have to be made without the full participation
of them membership or Board. However, these situations should be kept to
a minimum.
Project Related Problems
1) The number of projects
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A common problem faced by community development organizations is the
taking on of more projects than is feasible. This is particularly danger-
ous for organizations which intend to continue their organizing efforts
since development projects have a tendency to grow in complexity and
demand a tremendous investment of time. SUN-CDC found itself involved in
several housing projects, a business development program and a weatheriza-
tion project, all within two years. In the end, none of these projects
were given the attention they needed and there were far more failures than
necessary. In contrast, SWAP started with one abandoned building and only
added new buildings to their homesteading program as they gained the capa-
city to handle them.
There is a tendency among young organizations to try and solve all
the neighborhood's problems in a short amount of time. When dealing both
with the private sector and public funding sources, a successful track
record is critical. Therefore it is generally wise for a new development
organization to start with a limited project and expand only after it is
confident that development makes sense and is feasible.
Project Selection Criteria
It is difficult to set out ground rules for project selection in the
abstract since every community will have very different needs. However,
certain lessons about project selection in housing, business development,
and service delivery can be gleaned from the available case materials and
historical information.
Housing: The first observation is that community development organi-
zations which seek to continue organizing efforts should carefully consi-
der the implicit dangers of developing rental housing. During the develop-
ment process, particularly in rehabilitation projects, community organiza-
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tions are responsible to tenants, if there are any, and the surrounding
community. Code violations,. building delays, and accidents, all common
occurences, are all the responsibility of the community developer. In the
SUN-CDC case, the community organization was the landlord while codes
were violated, lead paint remained on the walls and the project dragged on
endlessly.
Once a project is completed and rented up, a comnunity organization
is then the landlord and mst be held ultimately responsible, even if
management services are contracted out. Once a landlord tenant relation-
ship exists, the community organization is less likely to be seen as an
advocate and more likely to be seen as the self serving owner, regardless
of good intentions.
In some communities, home ownership may be an option. Rehabilitation
and sale to moderate income families or homesteading are two models used
by community organizations which manage to remain largely free from the
houses once they are sold to new owners. In neighborhoods where multi-
family units exist, owner occupied rental housing or cooperative housing
might be considered. The community development organization can play the
role of identifying properties to be rehabilitated, matching properties
to owners or cooperators, and "packaging" appropriate subsidies and finan-
cing. Pressuring absentee landlords to sell their property at a low price
is an ideal role for the organizing arm of a community economic develop-
ment group.
Though this is not the appropriate place for an analysis os the fea-
sibility of community housing development, a broad range of cases indicate
that community organizations are still developing housing with the current
high interest rates and lack of subsidies. At this time the most success-
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ful programs appear to be those which are rehabilitating abandoned or
about to be abandoned properties and transferring them to moderate income
owners or owner-occupant landlords. In many states, including Massachu-
setts, state financed interest subsidies allow for moderate income housing
development. To the extent that rental subsidies such as Section 8 exist,
low income housing development is f easible. Without subsidies , such
development is nearly impossible, even for non-profit community organiza-
tions.
Business Development: Some community development organizations, par-
ticularly in states like Massachusetts which sponsor development finance
institutions, have undertaken business development. Often this consists
of providing technical assistance like business planning, favorable finan-
cing, and expansion space. While job creation in principle is beneficial
for communities, certain investments may be more appropriate for develop-
ment organizations with ties to community organizations. The objective of
a community organization might be to encourage community participation in
and control over business development. One example of this strategy is to
seat members of the -community organization on the Board of Directors of
the assisted companies and tie assistance to certain stipulations about
job quality, pay and local hiring. A number of CDCs in Massachusetts such
as the Cleghorn CDC in Fitchburg have taken this approach. Another stra-
tegy is to encourage the development of worker owned firms through Emplo-
yee Stock Ownership Plans or cooperatives. There are two types of situa-
tions which offer opportunities to create worker owned firms and encourage
community wide participation in the process. The first is the example of
a plant shut-down, when both workers and community residents raise capital
to purchase the closed plant. The Ohio Public Interest Campaign is
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exploring this strategy after their experience with an attenpted worker/
community buy-out in the Mahoning Valley. The second situation occurs
when an owner cannot operate a business any longer and seeks to sell out
to someone but lacks family members who can assume ownership. If the
firm is well established in the community there may be a perfect oppor-
tunity to organize community and worker ownership. What a community
development organization wants to avoid is creating business investments
which are isolated giveaways to business with no conmunity control.
Service delivery: Many community based development organizations
have undertaken activities which may be categorized as service delivery
such as weatherization or job. training. There are several issues a com-
munity development organization might consider before initiating a ser-
vice project (these issues are illustrated in the WISE case). Compli-
cated programs which involve a tremendous amount of aduinistration and
paperwork should be avoided. Programs like fuel assistance require tre-
mendous individual attention because of complicated income guidelines and
may discourage collective organizing.
It is best to sponsor programs which suggest collective activities
and are appropriate to organizing strategies. The WISE case offers a
good example of how weatherization can be used both to bring community
residents together and activate them through organizing against utility
rate increases.
Ongoing Organizational Problems
1) Controlling development while maintaining autonomy
The single most frequently cited reason for community organizations
not to undertake development activities is that such a move will either
compromise or overwhelm the community organization. While there is some
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evidence which. suggests that development can compromise community organi-
zers, many- staff members and leaders interviewed in the cases and the CCC
study believed the problem has been overstated.
There are two basic approaches for dealing with the problem of
development compromising organizing in the long run. One is to spin off
a development organization and maintain close leadership ties as suggested
above. A number of organizations taking this approach like the Union
Myles Community Coalition claim that they are able to maintain organiza-
tional autonomy from the development arm even when "everyone knows better".
In the SUN-CDC case however, city officials identified the development
group with the organizers even when they formally disassociated themselves.
Many community organizations like PACE have developed a "confronta-
tional development strategy". The key to such a strategy is to carefully
determine when in the development process it is useful to use the "club"
and when it is wiser to use a "professional" approach. In housing develop-
ment the "club" can be used against absentee landlords while the "profes-
sional" approach can be used with banks and city officials.
2) Diversion of energy from organizing
A number of critics of community economic development claim that com-
munity organizations which move to development then to neglect their
organizing efforts and eventually fall apart. This may be true in some
cases but most of the available evidence suggests that more often than
not, community organizations which are failing between their third and
fifth years (a common occurence) are failing for reasons other than their
move to-development activities. Often, community organizations at this
crisis age face a lack of core funding, and face difficulties in setting
goals and expanding programs to maintain leadership participation. In
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some cases the move to development is based on the erroneous hope that
such activities will replace start-up grants and grass roots fundraising.
There is very little evidence in the cases of the CCC study to suggest a
relationship between development strategies and the disintegration of
organizing efforts. Massachusetts Fair Share, for example, has managed
to carry out development and organizing activities because its organizing
arm is well funded, has seasoned leadership, and is careful to limit the
number of development projects it undertakes.
3) Fundraising: development for self-sufficiency
In few cases can development activities generate enough revenue to
support organizing efforts, particularly in the early years. In fact,
in nany cases, such as Massachusetts Fair Share's efforts in housing,
comnunity organizations have had to generate funding for development
efforts using their track records as organizers. It is critical that
some policy be developed early on to clearly delineate fundraising res-
ponsibilities. Some organizations have developed creative approaches to
developnent fundraising. The Cleveland organization cited earlies wrote
into its By-Laws that the development organization it spun off had to con-
tract with it for organizational development activities. SUN and SUN-CDC
attempted to do this as well but the financial relationship was never
clearly spelled out and became a fatal error.
In some cases, development projects can provide income for organizing
efforts after an initial start-up period. Fair Share is hopeful to gener-
ate development fees from its housing development work which will even-
tually become income.
4) The timing of development: maintaining grass roots activism
Nearly every organization studied by the CCC and the three organiza-
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tions presented in detail in this thesis faced problems with adjusting the
timing of development work with the needs of organizing. Organizers and
their membership are used to quick victories and controllable situations.
Most comnunity organizations thrive on creating victories whenever possi-
ble, even if they are piecemeal. Development on the other hand can be an
excruciatingly slow process and often leads to situations where the ball
is other people's hands.
There are a number of possible solutions to this problem. One of
course is training and experience which can teach both leaders and organi-
zers the complications and timing of development. Another is to carefully
plan development work with organizers and leaders so that confrontational
or direct actions can be utilized when appropriate. There are times in
the developnent process when visits by comnunity leaders or even demon-
strations can move along an otherwise slow process. PACE, for example,
demonstrated in front of landlord's homes to have properties sold to SWAP.
However, leaders and organizers must accept that direct action is not
always appropriate in development and that sometimes compromise is neces-
sary. For the most part this is true for organizing as well. A final
technique is to celebrate each step in the development process as a vic-
tory: site control, securing a building, loan approval, etc.
Both historical information and case studies indicate that while com-
bining organizing and development can be dangerous, it can also provide
significant opportunities for organizational growth, institutionalization,
and solving day-to-day community problems. It cannot be said that all
community organizations should undertake development. Many community
organizations are simply not ready and others may never have the opportun-
ity because of their structure, local politics or even leadership person-
R MMMM"
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alities. However, a body of experience exists to instruct community
organizations considering development what pitfalls to avoid and what
opportunities to seize. A significant number of community organizations
have successfully combined organizing and development by using a broad
array of structures, methods and projects. It remains for specific
community organizations to decide whether development is an appropriate
strategy and,if it iswhat approach to take. Where there is danger,
there is opportunity.
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APPENDIX
Center for Community Change. Cases
The Union-Miles Community Coalition has a carefully thought out
plan which calls for a separate development organization with
permanent structural links to the community organization. Of the
Union-Miles Development Corporation's 15 board members, 12 will come
from the Coalition. Six of these will be current board members of the
Coalition and six will be resident members elected at the Coalition's
annual senate. The remaining three members of the Development
Corporation will be made up of representatives, one each, from three
commercial banks in Cleveland. (As a result of neighborhood challenges
under the Community Reinvestment Act, the banks have agreed to
finance the non-profit rehabilitation development corporation.) The
new corporation's bylaws provide for some other links. Certain
bylaws can be amended only by the Coalition and not by the Development
Corporation membership. On of them is the rule that the Development
Corporation cannot do any organizing or knock on any doors. It must
contract with the Coalition for organizers' time to set up Governing
Task Forces for each project. The bylaws require that all projects
must be approved by a Governing Task Force created to oversee it.
A Task Force for a housing rehabilitation venture, for example,
might be composed of street clubs in the area where the renovation is
planned. While Union-Miles is beginning with housing rehabilitation,
it has plans for commeriil revitalization, including some new
development. The Union-Miles design is an attempt to satisfy the
desire ts promote development yet seperate development activities
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sufficiently from the community organization so that it can hold
development activity accountable and avoid blame should it go off
track.
The Buckeye-Woodland Community Congress is the oldest of the major
community organizations in Cleveland and served as a model for the
newer organiaations. Buckeye-Woodland is approximately seven years
old and has just this year established a development corporation.
Its approach to development is in some ways the most complex and
ingenious to be found across the country. Bank on Buckeye(BOB) is
a for-profit development corporation capitalized by a consortium of
four commercial banks. (It is described as one of the first development
corporations in the United States to involve more than one bank, and
required the resolution of some very complex regulatory tangles.)
While BOB is essentially a creature of the banks, it has a board with
balanced membership. Of its thirteen directors, six must be Buckeye-
Woodland residents and six are to be nominated by the banks.
The swing member is to be a city government representative who
works or lives in the area. Currently, it is the ward councilman.
Parallel to BOB, and part of the agreement with the banks, is
a second organization, the Buckeye Evaluation and Technical Institute
(BETI). BETI is a non-profit organization which will do the
research and spade work necessary to develop projects for BOB to
execute. Its staff will in effect be the core development staff
since BOB will be relying entirely on bank staff working part time.
Of BETI's 11-member board, 10 will be elected from the general
membership of the Buckeye-Woodland CRA Committee. The eleventh
member will be the BETI executive director. While the initial
155
focus will be on housing, the development corporation is planning
to expand to other development work.
This very elaborate organization structure is partly explained
by the community's concern to protect the Congress. Nominal
responsibility for the development arm lies with the banks so that
Buckeye-Woodland will not have to take the blame for any shortcomings
and will be free, as are the other groups in Cleveland, to critize
th-e development arm if it decides to . The Congress will not
participate in any of the profits the corporation may generate.
Thus it will not be "tainted". BETI is obligated, however, to
contract with the Congress to do the community organizing around
specific development projects. The staff and leadership regard this
as a clean solution. They were concerned with the confusion that would
arise if BETI were to organize regarding a project in an area wheie
the Congress had already organized. On result of this arrangement,
of course, will be some budget support for organizers already on
the Congress staff.
Buckeye-Woodland has gone to some lengths to build a firewall
between itself and the developnent activity. Yet it feels it has
managed to retain the amount of influence and control it needs to
have. Its CRA committee, the most informed part of its membership
on this subject, constitutes the board of BETI. BETI is the
key link, because BOB cannot really move without it, and BETI is
clearly tied in to the Community Congress. In any case, in the
Congress' view, the developnent corporation's ability to do work
will be heavily dependent on Buckeye-Woodland's well established
power and legitimacy.
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